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Abstract
1 Automated reasoning about uncertain knowledge has many applications. One diffi-
culty when developing such systems is the lack of a completely satisfactory integration of
logic and probability. We address this problem directly. Expressive languages like higher-
order logic are ideally suited for representing and reasoning about structured knowledge.
Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary
truth-values. The main technical problem studied in this paper is the following: Given
a set of sentences, each having some probability of being true, what probability should
be ascribed to other (query) sentences? A natural wish-list, among others, is that the
probability distribution (i) is consistent with the knowledge base, (ii) allows for a consis-
tent inference procedure and in particular (iii) reduces to deductive logic in the limit of
probabilities being 0 and 1, (iv) allows (Bayesian) inductive reasoning and (v) learning
in the limit and in particular (vi) allows confirmation of universally quantified hypothe-
ses/sentences. We translate this wish-list into technical requirements for a prior proba-
bility and show that probabilities satisfying all our criteria exist. We also give explicit
constructions and several general characterizations of probabilities that satisfy some or
all of the criteria and various (counter) examples. We also derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for extending beliefs about finitely many sentences to suitable probabilities
over all sentences, and in particular least dogmatic or least biased ones. We conclude
with a brief outlook on how the developed theory might be used and approximated in
autonomous reasoning agents. Our theory is a step towards a globally consistent and
empirically satisfactory unification of probability and logic.
1Presented at the Fifth Workshop on Combining Probability and Logic (Progic 2011) in New York.
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“The study of probability functions defined over the sentences of a rich enough formal
language yields interesting insights in more than one direction.”
— Haim Gaifman (1982)
1 Introduction
Motivation. Sophisticated computer applications generally require expressive languages for
knowledge representation and reasoning. In particular, such languages need to be able to rep-
resent both structured knowledge and uncertainty [Nil86, Hal03, Mug96, DK03, RD06, Ha´j01,
Wil02]. A suitable language for this purpose is higher-order logic [Chu40, Hen50, And02, Llo03,
vBD83, Lei94, Sha01], which admits higher-order functions that can take functions as arguments
and/or return functions as results. This facility is convenient for probabilistic modeling since it
means that theories can contain probability densities [Far08, Pfe07, GMR+08]. In particular,
many forms of probabilistic reasoning can be done in higher-order logic using the traditional
axiomatic method: a theory can be written down which has the intended interpretation as a
model and then conventional proof and computation techniques can be used to answer queries
[NL09, NLU08]. While such a computational approach is effective, it is sometimes more natural
to pose a problem as one where the probability of some sentences in the theory being true may
be strictly less than one and/or the query sentence (and its negation) may not be a logical con-
sequence of the theory. In such cases, deductive reasoning does not suffice for answering queries
and it becomes necessary to use probabilistic methods [Par94, KD07, RD06, Mug96, MR07].
Main aim. These considerations lead to the main technical issue studied in this paper:
Given a set of sentences, each having some probability of being true,
what probability should be ascribed to other (query) sentences?
We build on the work of Gaifman [Gai64] whose paper with Snir [GS82] develops a quite
comprehensive theory of probabilities on sentences in first-order Peano arithmetic. We take up
these ideas, using non-dogmatic priors [GS82] and additionally the minimum relative entropy
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principle as in [Wil08a], but for general theories and in a higher-order setting. We concentrate on
developing probabilities on sentences in a higher-order logic. This sets the stage for combining
it with the probabilities inside sentences approach [NL09, NLU08].
Summary of key concepts. Section 2 introduces higher-order logic and its relevant proper-
ties. We use the higher-order logic (Definitions 1, 2, and 8) based on Church’s simple theory of
types [Chu40, Hen50, And02]. We employ the Henkin semantics and make use of a particular
class of interpretations, called separating interpretations (Definition 12).
Section 3 gives the definition of probabilities on sentences in higher-order logic (Defini-
tion 17), introduces the Gaifman condition, and develops some basic properties of such prob-
abilities. Section 4 then introduces probabilities on interpretations and shows their close con-
nection with probabilities on sentences. Gaifman [Gai64] (generalized in Definition 20 and
Propositions 21, 22, 23) introduced a condition, called Gaifman in [SK66], that connects prob-
abilities of quantified sentences to limits of probabilities of finite conjunctions. In our case,
it effectively restricts probabilities to separating interpretations while maintaining countable
additivity.
While generally accepted in probability theory (Definition 28), some circles argue that
countable additivity (CA) does not have a good philosophical justification, and/or that it is
not needed since real experience is always finite, hence only non-asymptotic statements are
of practical relevance, for which CA is not needed. On the other hand, it is usually much
easier to first obtain asymptotic statements which requires CA, and then improve upon them.
Furthermore we will show that CA can guide us in the right direction to find good finitary prior
probabilities.
Another principle which has received much less attention than CA but is equally if not more
important is that of Cournot [Cou43, Sha06]: An event of probability (close to) zero singled
out in advance is physically impossible; or conversely, an event of probability 1 will physically
happen for sure. In short: zero probability means impossibility. The history of the semantics
of probability is stony [Fin73]. Cournot’s “forgotten” principle is one way of giving meaning
to probabilistic statements like, “the relative frequency of heads of a fair coin converges to 1/2
with probability 1”. The contraposition of Cournot is that one must assign non-zero probability
to possible events. If “events” are described by sentences and “possible” means it is possible to
satisfy these sentences, i.e. they possess a model, then we arrive at the strong Cournot principle
that satisfiable sentences should be assigned non-zero probability (Definitions 25 and 35). This
condition has been appropriately called ‘non-dogmatic’ in [GS82]. As long as something is not
proven false, there is a (small) chance it is valid in the intended interpretation. This non-
dogmatism is crucial in Bayesian inductive reasoning, since no evidence (however strong) can
increase a zero prior belief to a non-zero posterior belief [RH11]. The Gaifman condition is
inconsistent with the strong Cournot principle (Example 43), but consistent with a weaker
version (Definition 26). Probabilities that are Gaifman and (plain, not strong) Cournot allow
learning in the limit (Theorem 27 and Corollary 64).
A standard way to construct (general / Cournot / Gaifman) probabilities on sentences is to
construct (general / non-dogmatic / separating) probabilities on interpretations, and then trans-
fer them to sentences (Propositions 29, 32, and 38). At the same time we give model-theoretic
characterizations of the Gaifman condition (Corollary 34) and the Cournot condition (Defini-
tion 37). In Section 5, we give a particularly simple construction of a probability that is Cournot
and Gaifman (Theorem 40) and a complete characterization of general/Cournot/Gaifman prob-
abilities (Theorems 50 and 52 and Corollary 53). We also give various examples of (strong)
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(non)Cournot and/or Gaifman probabilities and (non)separating interpretations for countable
domains (Examples 46, 47, and 48) and finite domains (Examples 42, 43, 44, 45).
Section 7 considers the important practical situation of whether a real-valued function on
a set of sentences can be extended to a probability on all sentences; a necessary and sufficient
condition is given for this, as is a method for determining such probabilities using minimum
relative entropy introduced in Section 6. Prior knowledge and data constrain our (belief) prob-
abilities in various ways, which we need to take into account when constructing probabilities.
Prior knowledge is usually given in the form of probabilities on sentences like “the coin has head
probability 1/2”, or facts like “all electrons have the same charge”, or non-logical axioms like
“there are infinitely many natural numbers”. They correspond to requiring their probability to
be 1/2, extremely close to 1, and 1, respectively. It is therefore necessary to be able to go from
probabilities on sentences to probability on interpretations (Proposition 31). This allows us to
prove various necessary and sufficient conditions under which such partial probability specifica-
tions can be completed and what properties they have (Propositions 57 and 60). In particular
we show that hierarchical probabilistic knowledge (Definitions 61) is always probabilistically
consistent (Proposition 63). Further, seldom does knowledge constrain the probability on all
sentences to be uniquely determined. In this case it is natural to choose a probability that is
least dogmatic or biased [Nil86, Wil08a]. The minimum relative entropy (Definition 54) prin-
ciple can be used to construct such a unique minimally more informative probability that is
consistent with our prior knowledge (Definition 55 and Propositions 56 and 57).
Section 8 is a brief outlook on how the developed theory might be used and approximated in
autonomous reasoning agents. In particular, certain knowledge, learning in the limit (64), the
infamous black raven paradox, and the Monty Hall problem are discussed, but only briefly. The
paper ends with a more detailed discussion in Section 9 of the broader context and motivation of
this work, as well as related results in the literature, the outline of a framework for probabilistic
reasoning and modeling in higher-order logic, and future research directions.
While some of the results presented in this paper are known in the first-order case and their
extension to the higher-order case is straightforward, it nevertheless seems useful to provide
a survey of this material (with proofs included). Also, many beautiful ideas in the long and
technical paper by Gaifman [GS82] deserve wider attention than they have received. We hope
our exposition helps to rectify this situation.
2 Logic
We review here a standard formulation of higher-order logic [And02] that is based on Church’s
simple theory of types [Chu40]. Other references on higher-order logic include [Llo03, Far08,
vBD83, Lei94, Sha01]. Some discussion of the interesting history of the simple theory of types
is given in [And02, Far08].
The best way to think about higher-order logic is that it is the formalization of everyday
informal mathematics: whatever mathematical description one might give of some situation, the
formalization of that situation in higher-order logic is likely to be a straightforward translation
of the informal description. In particular, higher-order logic provides a suitable foundation
for mathematics itself which has several advantages over more traditional approaches that are
based on axiomatizing sets in first-order logic. Furthermore, higher-order logic is the logical
formalism of choice for much of theoretical computer science and also applications areas such as
software and hardware verification. For a convincing account of the advantages of higher-order
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over first-order logic in computer science, see [Far08].
The logic presented here differs in a minor way from that in [And02] in that we omit the
description operator ι, for reasons that are discussed later. All the results from [And02] that
are used here also hold for the logic with ι omitted, by obvious changes to their proofs. In
addition the notation for the logic used here differs somewhat from that in [And02], but the
correspondences will always be clear. There are also a few differences in terminology here
compared to [And02] that are noted along the way.
We begin with the definition of a type.
Definition 1 (type α) A type is defined inductively as follows.
1. o is a type.
2. ı is a type.
3. If α and β are types, then α→ β is a type.
In this definition, o is the type of the truth values, ı is the type of individuals, and α → β
is the type of functions from elements of type α to elements of type β. We use the convention
that → is right associative. So, for example, when we write α → β → γ → κ we mean
α→ (β → (γ → κ)). A function type is a type of the form α→ β, for some α and β.
There is a denumerable list of variables of each type. The logical constants are =α→α→o, for
each type α. The denotation of equality =α→α→o is the identity relation between individuals of
type α. In addition, there may be other non-logical constants of various types. The alphabet is
the set of all variables and constants.
Next comes the definition of a term.
Definition 2 (term t) A term, together with its type, is defined inductively as follows.
1. A variable of type α is a term of type α.
2. A constant of type α is a term of type α.
3. If tβ is a term of type β and xα a variable of type α, then λxα.tβ is a term of type α→ β.
4. If sα→β is a term of type α→ β and tα a term of type α, then (sα→β tα) is a term of type
β.
A formula is a term of type o. A closed term is a term with no free variables. A sentence is a
closed formula. A theory is a set of formulas.
If the set of non-logical constants is countable, then the set of terms is denumerable. As
shown in [And02, p.212], using equality, it is easy to define >o (truth), ⊥o (falsity), ∧o→o→o
(conjunction), ∨o→o→o (disjunction), ¬o→o (negation), ∀xα.to (universal quantification), and
∃xα.to (existential quantification). The axioms for the logic are as follows [And02, p.213]:
Axiom 3 (logical axioms)
1. Truth values: (go→o >o) ∧ (go→o ⊥o) = ∀xo.(go→o xo)
2. Leibniz’ law: (xα = yα)→ ((hα→o xα) = (hα→o yα))
3. Extensionality: (fα→β = gα→β) = ∀xα.((fα→β xα) = (gα→β xα))
4. β-reduction: (λxα.tβ sα) = tβ{xα/sα} (provided that sα is free for xα in tβ)
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In the above, go→o, . . . are variables of the indicated type, xα is a syntactical variable for
variables of type α, and tβ, . . . are syntactical variables for terms of the indicated type. Also
tβ{xα/sα} is the result of simultaneously substituting sα for all free occurrences of xα in tβ.
Axiom (1) expresses the idea the truth and falsity are the only truth values; Axioms (2)
(for each type α) express a basic property of equality; Axioms (3) (for each type α → β) are
the axioms of extensionality; and Axiom schemata (4) is the axiom for β-reduction.
Here is the single rule of inference [And02, p.213]:
Rule 4 (rule of inference; equality substitution) From to and sα = rα, infer the result
of replacing one occurrence of sα in to by an occurrence of rα, provided that the occurrence of
sα in to is not (an occurrence of a variable) immediately preceded by a λ.
The logic also has an equational reasoning system that has been used as the computational
basis for a functional logic programming language [Llo03, NL09, NLU08, LN11].
In the following, to simplify the notation, we usually omit the type subscripts on terms;
the type of a term will always either be unimportant or clear from the context. We use
ϕ, χ, ψ for sentences and sometimes for formulas, and t, r, s for terms. With this notation,
∀x.ϕ ≡ [λx.ϕ = λx.>] and ∃x.ϕ ≡ [λx.ϕ 6= λx.⊥].
The logic includes Church’s λ-calculus: a term of the form λx.t is an abstraction and a term
of the form (s t) is an application.
The logic is given a conventional Henkin semantics [Hen50].
Definition 5 (frame {Dα}α) A frame is a collection {Dα}α of non-empty sets, one for each
type α, satisfying the following conditions.
1. Do = {T,F}.
2. Dβ→γ is some collection of functions from Dβ to Dγ.
For each type α, Dα is a called a domain.
The members of Do are called the truth values and the members of Dı are called individuals.
Definition 6 (valuation V ) Given a frame {Dα}α, a valuation V is a function that maps
each constant having type α to an element of Dα such that V (=α→α→o) is the function from Dα
into Dα→o defined by
V (=α→α→o)x y =
{
T if x = y
F otherwise,
for x, y ∈ Dα.
Definition 7 (variable assignment V) A variable assignment V with respect to a frame
{Dα}α is a function that maps each variable of type α to an element of Dα.
An interpretation can now be defined.
Definition 8 (interpretation 〈{Dα}α, V 〉) A pair I ≡ 〈{Dα}α, V 〉 is an interpretation if
there is a function V such that, for each variable assignment ν and for each term t of type α,
V(t, I, ν) ∈ Dα and the following conditions are satisfied.
1. V(x, I, V) = V(x), where x is a variable.
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2. V(C, I, V) = V (C), where C is a constant.
3. V(λx.s, I, V) = the function whose value for each d ∈ Dβ is V(s, I, V′), where λx.s has
type β → γ and V′ is V except V′(x) = d.
4. V((r s), I, V) = V(r, I, V)(V(s, I, V)).
If 〈{Dα}α, V 〉 is an interpretation, then the function V is uniquely defined. V(t, I, V) is called
the denotation of t with respect to I and ν. If t is a closed term, then V(t, I, V) is independent
of V and we write it as V(t, I). Not every pair 〈{Dα}α, V 〉 is an interpretation; to be an
interpretation, every term must have a denotation with respect to each variable assignment.
What is called an interpretation here is called a general model in [And02], following Henkin.
In [And02], a general model is called a standard model if, for each α and β, Dα→β is the set of
all functions from Dα to Dβ. Moving from standard models to general models was the crucial
step that allowed Henkin to prove the completeness of the logic [Hen50].
Definition 9 (satisfiable) Let t be a formula, I ≡ 〈{Dα}α, V 〉 an interpretation, and V a
variable assignment with respect to {Dα}α.
1. V satisfies t in I if V(t, I, V) = T.
2. t is satisfiable in I if there is a variable assignment which satisfies t in I.
3. t is valid in I if every variable assignment satisfies t in I.
4. t is valid if t is valid in every interpretation.
5. A model for a theory is an interpretation in which each formula in the theory is valid.
Definition 10 (consistency) A theory is consistent if ⊥ cannot be derived from the theory.
Definition 11 (logical consequence) A formula t is a logical consequence of a theory if t
is valid in every model of the theory.
We will have need for a particular class of interpretations, defined as follows.
Definition 12 (separating interpretation/model) An interpretation I for an alphabet is
separating if, for every pair r, s of closed terms of the same function type, say, α → β, such
that V(r, I) 6= V(s, I), there exists a closed term t of type α such that V((r t), I) 6= V((s t), I).
A separating model is a separating interpretation that is a model (for some set of formulas).
We emphasize that, in the definition of a separating interpretation, the closed term t is
formed only from symbols in the given alphabet. Intuitively, an interpretation is separating if,
for every pair r, s of closed terms of the same type α → β, whose respective denotations in
the interpretation are different, there exists a closed term t of type α for which the respec-
tive denotations in the interpretation of (r t) and (s t) are different. Thus, in a separating
interpretation, closed terms that have distinct functions as denotations must be distinct on an
argument in the domain that is the denotation of some closed term using the given alphabet
and thus is ‘accessible’ or ‘nameable’ via that term.
The concept of a separating interpretation is closely related to the concept of an extension-
ally complete theory that plays a crucial part in the proof of completeness [And02, p.248].
Definition 13 (extensionally complete) A set S of sentences is extensionally complete if,
for every pair r, s of closed terms of the same function type, say, α→ β, there exists a closed
term t of type α such that r 6= s→ (r t) 6= (s t) is derivable from S.
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A connection with separating interpretations is provided by the following result.
Proposition 14 (extensionally complete ⇒ separating) Every model of an extension-
ally complete set of sentences is separating.
Proof. Let S be a set of sentences that is extensionally complete and I be a model for
S. Suppose that r, s is a pair of closed terms of the same function type, say, α → β, such
that V(r, I) 6= V(s, I). By extensional completeness, there exists a closed term t such that
r 6= s → (r t) 6= (s t) is derivable from S. Since I is a model for S and the proof system is
sound, it follows that V((r t), I) 6= V((s t), I). Hence I is separating.
Now we show that, if we are willing to expand the alphabet, any set of sentences having a
model also has a separating model in an expanded alphabet.
Proposition 15 (existence of separating models) If a set S of sentences has a model,
then there exists an alphabet that includes the original alphabet and an interpretation based on
the expanded alphabet which is a separating model for S.
Proof. Since S has a model, S is consistent. By [And02, Theorem 5500], there is an expansion
of the original alphabet and a set T of sentences such that S ⊆ T , T is consistent, and T is
extensionally complete in the expanded alphabet. Since T is consistent, by Henkin’s Theorem
[And02, Theorem 5501], it has a model (based on the expanded alphabet). By Proposition 14,
this model must be a separating one, and it is also a model for S.
The most important property of the logic that we will need is compactness [And02, Theorem
5503].
Theorem 16 (compactness) If every finite subset of a set S of sentences has a model, then
S has a model.
In fact, most of the development in the paper can be carried out in any logic that has the
compactness property.
While the version of higher-order logic introduced in this section generally provides much
more direct and succinct formalisations than first-order logic, for practical applications a num-
ber of extensions are highly desirable. Some of these extensions are nothing more than abbre-
viations, such as those used to introduce the connectives and quantifiers, and some are deeper.
These extensions include many-sortedness, which allows more than one domain of individuals;
tuples and product types; and type constructors and polymorphism. The logic of [Llo03], which
is also used in [NL09, NLU08], includes all these extensions. These and other extensions are
discussed in [Far08].
3 Probabilities on Sentences
We now define probabilities on sentences. They are not probabilities in the conventional sense
of probability theory (on σ-algebras); however, a connection between probabilities on sentences
and (conventional) probabilities on a σ-algebra on the set of interpretations will be made below.
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Definition 17 (probability on sentences) Let S be the set of all sentences (for some al-
phabet). A probability (on sentences) is a non-negative function µ : S → R satisfying the
following conditions:
1. If ϕ is valid, then µ(ϕ) = 1.
2. If ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) is valid, then µ(ϕ ∨ ψ) = µ(ϕ) + µ(ψ).
For a sentence ψ, where µ(ψ) > 0, one can define the conditional probability µ(·|ψ) by
µ(ϕ|ψ) = µ(ϕ ∧ ψ)
µ(ψ)
,
for each sentence ϕ.
A probability µ : S → R on sets of sentences has the following intended meaning:
For a sentence ϕ, µ(ϕ) is the degree of belief that ϕ is true.
Definition 18 (pairwise disjoint sentences) The sentences ϕ1, ..., ϕn are pairwise disjoint
if, for each i, j = 1, ..., n such that i 6= j, ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj) is valid.
Proposition 19 (properties of probability on sentences) Let µ : S → R be a probability
on sentences. Then the following hold:
1. µ(¬ϕ) = 1− µ(ϕ), for each ϕ ∈ S.
2. µ(ϕ) ≤ 1, for each ϕ ∈ S.
3. If ϕ is unsatisfiable, then µ(ϕ) = 0.
4. If ϕ→ ψ is valid, then µ(ϕ) ≤ µ(ψ).
5. If ϕ = ψ is valid, then µ(ϕ) = µ(ψ).
6. If {ϕi}ni=1 is a finite subset of pairwise disjoint
sentences in S, then µ(∨ni=1 ϕi) = ∑ni=1 µ(ϕi).
7. If {ϕi}ni=1 is a finite subset of S, then µ(
∨n
i=1 ϕi) ≤
∑n
i=1 µ(ϕi).
8. The following are equivalent:
(a) For each ϕ ∈ S, µ(ϕ) = 1 implies ϕ is valid.
(b) For each ϕ ∈ S, µ(ϕ) = 0 implies ϕ is unsatisfiable.
9. If µ(ψ) > 0, then µ(·|ψ) is a probability.
10. µ(ϕ ∨ ψ) + µ(ϕ ∧ ψ) = µ(ϕ) + µ(ψ).
Proof. The proof is elementary and standard, and only included for completeness.
1. Since ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) is valid, µ(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) = µ(ϕ) + µ(¬ϕ). Also, since ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is valid,
µ(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) = 1. Thus µ(¬ϕ) = 1− µ(ϕ).
2. Since 1− µ(ϕ) = µ(¬ϕ) ≥ 0, we have that µ(ϕ) ≤ 1.
3. Note that ϕ is unsatisfiable iff ¬ϕ is valid. Thus µ(¬ϕ) = 1−µ(ϕ) = 1, so that µ(ϕ) = 0.
4. Note first that ϕ → ψ is valid iff ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) is valid. Thus µ(ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) =
µ(ϕ) + µ(¬ψ) = µ(ϕ) + 1− µ(ψ). Hence µ(ϕ) = µ(ψ) + µ(ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)− 1 ≤ µ(ψ).
5. This follows immediately from Part 4.
9
6. The proof is by induction on n. When n = 1 the result is obvious. Assume now the
result is true for n− 1. Note that ∧ni=2 ¬(ϕ1∧ϕi) is valid and so ¬(ϕ1∧∨ni=2 ϕi) is valid. Then
µ(
∨n
i=1 ϕi)
= µ(ϕ1 ∨
∨n
i=2 ϕi)
= µ(ϕ1) + µ(
∨n
i=2 ϕi) [¬(ϕ1 ∧
∨n
i=2 ϕi) is valid]
= µ(ϕ1) +
∑n
i=2 µ(ϕi) [induction hypothesis]
=
∑n
i=1 µ(ϕi).
7. The proof is by induction on n. When n = 1 the result is obvious. Assume now the
result is true for n− 1. Then
µ(
∨n
i=1 ϕi)
= µ((ϕ1 ∧ ¬
∨n
i=2 ϕi) ∨
∨n
i=2 ϕi)
= µ(ϕ1 ∧ ¬
∨n
i=2 ϕi) + µ(
∨n
i=2 ϕi)
≤ µ(ϕ1) +
∑n
i=2 µ(ϕi) [Part 4 and induction hypothesis]
=
∑n
i=1 µ(ϕi).
8. Suppose that, for each ϕ ∈ S, µ(ϕ) = 1 implies ϕ is valid. Now let ψ ∈ S satisfy
µ(ψ) = 0. By Part 1, µ(¬ψ) = 1. Thus ¬ψ is valid and so ψ is unsatisfiable.
Conversely, suppose that, for each ϕ ∈ S, µ(ϕ) = 0 implies ϕ is unsatisfiable. Now let
ψ ∈ S satisfy µ(ψ) = 1. By Part 1, µ(¬ψ) = 0. Thus ¬ψ is unsatisfiable and so ψ is valid.
9. Suppose that ϕ is valid. Then µ(ϕ|ψ) = µ(ϕ∧ψ)
µ(ψ)
= µ(ψ)
µ(ψ)
= 1.
Suppose that ¬(ϕ ∧ χ) is valid. Then
µ(ϕ ∨ χ|ψ)
= µ((ϕ ∨ χ) ∧ ψ) / µ(ψ)
= µ((ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (χ ∧ ψ)) / µ(ψ)
= [µ(ϕ ∧ ψ) + µ(χ ∧ ψ)] / µ(ψ) [¬((ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ (χ ∧ ψ)) is valid]
= µ(ϕ|ψ) + µ(χ|ψ).
Thus µ(·|ψ) is a probability.
10. Let χ := ¬ϕ ∧ ψ. Then
µ(ϕ ∨ ψ) + µ(ϕ ∧ ψ)
= µ(ϕ ∨ χ) + µ(ϕ ∧ ψ) [elementary logic]
= µ(ϕ) + µ(χ) + µ(ϕ ∧ ψ) [¬(ϕ ∧ χ) is valid and Def. 17.2]
= µ(ϕ) + µ(χ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) [¬(χ ∧ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) is valid and Def. 17.2]
= µ(ϕ) + µ(ψ) [elementary logic]
Next we introduce Gaifman probabilities.
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Definition 20 (Gaifman probability) Let µ : S → R be a probability on sentences. Then µ
is Gaifman if
µ(r = s) = inf
{t1,...,tn}
µ(
n∧
i=1
((r ti) = (s ti))),
for every pair r and s of closed terms having the same function type, say, α → β, and where
{t1, ..., tn} ranges over all finite sets of closed terms of type α.
Proposition 21 (Gaifman probability) Let µ : S → R be a probability on sentences. Then
the following are equivalent.
1. µ is Gaifman.
2. µ(r 6= s) = sup
{t1,...,tn}
µ(
n∨
i=1
((r ti) 6= (s ti))),
for every pair r and s of closed terms having the same function type, say, α → β, and
where {t1, ..., tn} ranges over all finite sets of closed terms of type α.
3. µ(∃x.ϕ) = sup
{t1,...,tn}
µ(
n∨
i=1
ϕ{x/ti}),
for every formula ϕ having a single free variable x of type α, say, and where {t1, ..., tn}
ranges over all finite sets of closed terms of type α.
4. µ(∀x.ϕ) = inf
{t1,...,tn}
µ(
n∧
i=1
ϕ{x/ti}),
for every formula ϕ having a single free variable x of type α, say, and where {t1, ..., tn}
ranges over all finite sets of closed terms of type α.
Proof. 1. implies 2. Suppose that the probability µ is Gaifman. Then
µ(r 6= s)
= 1− µ(r = s)
= 1− inf{t1,...,tn} µ(
∧n
i=1((r ti) = (s ti)))
= 1− inf{t1,...,tn} µ(¬
∨n
i=1((r ti) 6= (s ti)))
= 1− inf{t1,...,tn}(1− µ(
∨n
i=1((r ti) 6= (s ti)))
= sup{t1,...,tn} µ(
∨n
i=1((r ti) 6= (s ti))).
Hence 2. holds.
2. implies 3. Suppose that 2. holds. Then
µ(∃x.ϕ)
= µ(λx.ϕ 6= λx.F )
= sup{t1,...,tn} µ(
∨n
i=1((λx.ϕ ti) 6= (λx.F ti)))
= sup{t1,...,tn} µ(
∨n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}).
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Hence 3. holds.
3. implies 4. Suppose that 3. holds. Then
µ(∀x.ϕ)
= µ(¬∃x.¬ϕ)
= 1− µ(∃x.¬ϕ)
= 1− sup{t1,...,tn} µ(
∨n
i=1 ¬ϕ{x/ti})
= 1− sup{t1,...,tn} µ(¬
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti})
= 1− sup{t1,...,tn}(1− µ(
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}))
= inf{t1,...,tn} µ(
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}).
Hence 4. holds.
4. implies 1. Suppose that 4. holds. Then
µ(r = s)
= µ(∀x.((r x) = (s x))) [Axioms of Extensionality]
= inf{t1,...,tn} µ(
∧n
i=1((r x) = (s x)){x/ti})
= inf{t1,...,tn} µ(
∧n
i=1((r ti) = (s ti))).
Hence 1. holds.
Proposition 22 (limits for countable alphabet) Let the alphabet be countable, µ : S → R
a probability on sentences, and ϕ a formula having a single free variable x of type α.
1. sup
{t1,...,tn}
µ(
n∨
i=1
ϕ{x/ti}) = lim
n→∞
µ(
n∨
i=1
ϕ{x/ti})
2. inf
{t1,...,tn}
µ(
n∧
i=1
ϕ{x/ti}) = lim
n→∞
µ(
n∧
i=1
ϕ{x/ti}),
where, on the LHS, {t1, ..., tn} ranges over all finite sets of closed terms of type α and, on the
RHS, t1, t2, ... is an enumeration of all closed terms of type α.
Proof. Since the alphabet is countable, the set of all closed terms of type α is countable and
hence can be enumerated.
1. Let {t′1, ..., t′m} be a subset of closed terms of type α. Let n be sufficiently large so
that each t′j, for j = 1, ...,m, appears in the enumeration t1, ..., tn of the first n terms of an
enumeration of all closed terms of type α.
Then
∨m
j=1 ϕ{x/t′j} →
∨n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti} is valid, so that
µ(
∨m
j=1 ϕ{x/t′j}) ≤ µ(
∨n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}),
by Proposition 19.4. By first taking the supremum on the RHS and then the supremum on the
LHS we get
sup{t′1,...,t′m} µ(
∨m
j=1 ϕ{x/t′j}) ≤ supn µ(
∨n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}).
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Conversely we have
sup{t′1,...,t′m} µ(
∨m
j=1 ϕ{x/t′j}) ≥ µ(
∨n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}).
since the sup on the LHS includes {t1, ..., tn}. Now taking the limit n→∞ and combining both
inequalities gives equality. Proposition 19.4 gives that µ(ϕ∨ψ) ≥ µ(ϕ); hence µ(∨ni=1 ϕ{x/ti})
is monotone non-decreasing in n, which allows the replacement of supn by limn→∞.
2. The proof is similar.
We can reduce the class of terms that is necessary to “browse” through even further, by
considering only one term from each equivalence class, where two terms t and t′ are equivalent
iff t = t′ is valid.
Proposition 23 (Gaifman for countable alphabet) Let the alphabet be countable and µ :
S → R a probability on sentences. Then the following are equivalent.
1. µ is Gaifman.
2. µ(r = s) = lim
n→∞
µ(
n∧
i=1
((r ti) = (s ti))),
for every pair r and s of closed terms having the same function type, say, α → β, and
where t1, t2, . . . is an enumeration of all closed terms of type α.
3. µ(r 6= s) = lim
n→∞
µ(
n∨
i=1
((r ti) 6= (s ti))),
for every pair r and s of closed terms having the same function type, say, α → β, and
where t1, t2, . . . is an enumeration of all closed terms of type α.
4. µ(∃x.ϕ) = lim
n→∞
µ(
n∨
i=1
ϕ{x/ti}),
for every formula ϕ having a single free variable x of type α, say, and where t1, t2, . . . is
an enumeration of all closed terms of type α.
5. µ(∀x.ϕ) = lim
n→∞
µ(
n∧
i=1
ϕ{x/ti}),
for every formula ϕ having a single free variable x of type α, say, and where t1, t2, . . . is
an enumeration of all closed terms of type α.
In each case, the enumeration t1, t2, . . . of closed terms of type α can be reduced to one where a
single representative is chosen from each equivalence class under the equivalence relation t and
t′ are equivalent if t = t′ is valid.
Proof. Two terms t and t′ are said to be equivalent iff t = t′ is valid, which implies
ϕ{x/t} = ϕ{x/t′} is valid. This allows us to relax in the proof of Proposition 22 ‘appears’ by
‘is equivalent to some term in’ and ‘includes’ by ‘includes a term equivalent to some term in’.
Finally combine this with Proposition 21 and Definition 20.
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While these forms of the Gaifman condition closely resemble the continuity condition (count-
able additivity (CA) axiom) in measure theory, we will see that CA over (general) interpre-
tations is derived from the compactness theorem and not from the Gaifman condition (see
Definition 28 and Proposition 30 in the next section). But the Gaifman condition confines
probabilities to separating interpretations while preserving CA (Propositions 29 and 31).
Example 24 (natural numbers Nat) Consider the standard type Nat of natural numbers,
as the type of individuals, and the usual Peano axioms. Let 0 be the constant of type Nat whose
denotation is the natural number 0, and n ≡ Sn(0) = (S (S (S · · · (S 0)))) be the term of type
Nat whose denotation is the natural number n, where S is a constant of type Nat→ Nat whose
denotation is the successor function. In practice one usually defines denumerably many con-
stants 1, 2, 3, ..., one for each natural number, directly. Further, let +,× : Nat→ Nat→ Nat be
functions with their usual axioms and meaning. Now there are many closed terms that represent
the same natural number. For instance 8, (λx.x 8), (3+5), (2×4) are different terms, all having
the number 8 as denotation. For type Nat, it is sufficient to choose tn = n in Proposition 23.4,
and so the condition in Definition 20 (indeed) reduces to the one used by Gaifman [GS82]. ♦
Of particular interest are probabilities that are strictly positive on satisfiable sentences since
this is a desirable property of a prior. This suggests the following definition.
Definition 25 (strongly Cournot probability) A probability µ : S → R is strongly
Cournot if, for each ϕ ∈ S, ϕ is satisfiable implies µ(ϕ) > 0.
By Part 8 of Proposition 19, a probability is strongly Cournot iff, for each ϕ ∈ S, ϕ is
not valid implies µ(ϕ) < 1, or, by contraposition, µ(ϕ) = 1 implies ϕ is valid. This is akin
to Cournot’s principle as discussed in the introduction that an event of probability 1 singled
out in advance will happen for sure in the real world. We will see this general idea plays an
important role for inductive inference.
However, the following weaker form of the Cournot principle will turn out to be more useful.
Definition 26 (Cournot probability) A probability µ : S → R is Cournot if, for each ϕ ∈
S, ϕ has a separating model implies µ(ϕ) > 0.
Clearly a strongly Cournot probability is Cournot. It will be the Cournot probabilities (not
the strongly Cournot ones) that will be of most interest in the subsequent development. The
major reasons for this are as follows. First, Theorem 40 below shows that, if the alphabet
is countable, there exists a probability on sentences that is Cournot and Gaifman. Such a
probability makes a good prior. Second, the Cournot and Gaifman conditions are necessary
and sufficient to do learning in the limit of universal hypotheses as the following theorem shows
and as discussed in more detail in Section 8.
Theorem 27 (confirming universal hypotheses) Let the alphabet be countable, µ : S → R
a probability on sentences, ϕ a formula having a single free variable x of some type α, t1, t2, ...
an enumeration of (representatives of) all closed terms of type α. Then
µ(∀x.ϕ |
n∧
i=1
ϕ{x/ti}) n→∞−→ 1 ⇔ µ(
n∧
i=1
ϕ{x/ti}) n→∞−→ µ(∀x.ϕ) > 0
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If the left hand side (hence also the r.h.s.) holds, we say that µ can confirm universal hypothesis
∀x.ϕ. It also holds that
µ can confirm all universal hypotheses
that have a separating model
⇔ µ is Gaifman and Cournot
Proof. (top⇐)
limn→∞ µ(∀x.ϕ |
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti})
=
µ(∀x.ϕ)
limn→∞ µ(
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti})
[∀x.ϕ→ ∧ni=1 ϕ{x/ti}]
=
µ(∀x.ϕ)
µ(∀x.ϕ) [
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}) n→∞−→ µ(∀x.ϕ)]
= 1 [µ(∀x.ϕ) > 0]
(top ⇒) As can be seen from the ⇐ proof, if one or both of the conditions fail, then
µ(∀x.ϕ | ∧ni=1 ϕ{x/ti}) does not converge to 1.
For the bottom⇔ we abbreviate the statements
L(ϕ) := [µ(∀x.ϕ | ∧ni=1 ϕ{x/ti}) n→∞−→ 1]
G(ϕ) := [µ(
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}) n→∞−→ µ(∀x.ϕ)]
S(ϕ) := [∀x.ϕ has a separating model]
A(ϕ) := [µ(∀x.ϕ) > 0]
In this notation, the top⇔ reads L(ϕ) iff G(ϕ) and A(ϕ).
(bottom ⇐) Assume µ is Gaifman and Cournot and S(ϕ). This implies G(ϕ) and A(ϕ).
By top⇐ we get L(ϕ). We have shown that for any ϕ, if µ is Gaifman and Cournot, then S(ϕ)
implies L(ϕ).
(bottom⇒) Case 1 [S(ϕ) is true] Then by assumption, L(ϕ). Then by top⇒ we get G(ϕ)
and A(ϕ). Note that every sentence ψ can be written as ψ = ∀x.ϕ with ϕ := [ψ ∧ (x = x)]
being a formula having a single free variable x. Therefore, µ(ψ) = µ(∀x.ϕ) > 0 for all ψ that
have a separating model. Hence µ is Cournot.
Case 2 [S(ϕ) is false] That is, ∀x.ϕ has no separating model, therefore ¬∀x.ϕ must have (at
least one) separating model, say Î. Since Î is a separating model of ∃x.¬ϕ, Definition 12 implies
that there exists a closed term t such that Î is also a separating model of χ := ¬ϕ{x/t}. Now
µ(∀x.ϕ) + µ(χ)
= µ(∀x.ϕ ∨ χ) [∀x.ϕ and χ are disjoint]
= µ(∀x.(ϕ ∨ χ)) [x is not free in χ]
= limn µ(
∧n
i=1(ϕ ∨ χ){x/ti}) [since S(ϕ ∨ χ), Case 1 implies G(ϕ ∨ χ)]
= limn µ(
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti} ∨ χ)) [x is not free in χ]
= limn µ(
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}) + µ(χ) [t = ti for some i, and ϕ{x/t} ∧ χ false]
This proves G(ϕ) for S(ϕ) false.
Case 1 and 2 together prove G(ϕ) for all ϕ, hence µ is Gaifman.
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4 Probabilities on Interpretations
We now study probabilities defined on sets of interpretations.
Consider the set I of interpretations (for the alphabet). A Borel σ-algebra can be defined
on I. For that, a topology needs to be defined first. Given some alphabet, let S denote the set
of sentences based on the alphabet. For each sentence ϕ, let mod(ϕ) denote the set
{I ∈ I | ϕ is valid in I}.
Consider the set BS = {mod(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ S}. Since BS is closed under finite intersections, it is a
basis for a topology T on I. BS is also an algebra, since it is closed under complementation
and finite unions, and I ∈ BS . Let B be the Borel σ-algebra formed from the topology T on
I. In the following, probabilities on B will be considered.
Suppose that the alphabet is countable (equivalently, the set of constants is countable).
Then the set of terms and, in particular, the set S is countable. In this case, BS is countable
and hence the σ-algebra generated by BS is the same as the Borel σ-algebra B generated by T .
Definition 28 (probability on interpretations) A function µ∗ : B → R is a finitely ad-
ditive probability on algebra B if µ∗(∅) = 0 and µ∗(I) = 1 and µ∗(A ∩ C) + µ∗(A ∪ C) =
µ∗(A) + µ∗(C) for all A,C ∈ B. It is called a Countably Additive (CA) probability or simply
a probability if additionally for all countable collections {Ai}i∈I ⊂ B of pairwise disjoint sets
with
⋃
i∈I Ai ∈ B it holds that µ∗(
⋃
i∈I Ai) =
∑
i∈I µ
∗(Ai).
For CA-probabilities, B is usually assumed to be a Borel σ-algebra, i.e. ⋃i∈I Ai ∈ B always
holds. Countable additivity is equivalent to finite additivity and continuity:
lim
n→∞
µ∗(
⋂n
i=1Ai) = µ
∗(limn→∞
⋂n
i=1Ai) for all Ai ∈ B.
First we show that a probability on the algebra gives a probability on sentences.
Proposition 29 (µ∗ ⇒ µ) Let S be the set of sentences, I the set of interpretations, BS =
{mod(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ S} the algebra on I, and µ∗ : BS → R a finitely additive probability on BS .
Define µ : S → R by
µ(ϕ) = µ∗(mod(ϕ)),
for each ϕ ∈ S. Then µ is a probability on S.
Proof. The two conditions of Definition 17 have to be established. Note that µ is non-negative
because µ∗ is.
Suppose that ϕ is valid. Then mod(ϕ) = I, so that µ(ϕ) = µ∗(mod(ϕ)) = µ∗(I) = 1.
Suppose that ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) is valid. Hence mod(ϕ) ∩mod(ψ) = ∅. Thus
µ(ϕ ∨ ψ)
= µ∗(mod(ϕ ∨ ψ))
= µ∗(mod(ϕ) ∪mod(ψ))
= µ∗(mod(ϕ)) + µ∗(mod(ψ)) [µ∗ is finitely additive]
= µ(ϕ) + µ(ψ).
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Hence µ is a probability.
Note that only the finite additivity of µ∗ is needed in Proposition 29.
Next we show that a probability on sentences gives a probability on interpretations. For
this, a useful property of probabilities on BS is needed.
Proposition 30 (finite ⇔ countable additivity) Let S be the set of sentences, I the set
of interpretations, and BS = {mod(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ S} the algebra on I. Then every finitely additive
probability on BS is countably additive on BS .
Proof. Let µ∗ be a finitely additive probability on BS . Suppose that {ϕn}∞n=1 is a sequence
of sentences such that mod(ϕn) ⊇ mod(ϕn+1), for n = 1, 2, . . . , and
⋂∞
n=1 mod(ϕn) = ∅.
Clearly ϕn+1 −→ ϕn is valid, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Next we claim that ϕn0 is unsatisfiable, for
some n0. To prove this, suppose on the contrary that ϕn is satisfiable, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Since
ϕn+1 −→ ϕn is valid, for n = 1, 2, . . ., it follows that {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} is satisfiable, for n = 1, 2, . . ..
By the compactness theorem, {ϕn}∞n=1 is satisfiable, which contradicts the assumption that⋂∞
n=1 mod(ϕn) = ∅. Thus the claim that ϕn0 is unsatisfiable, for some n0, is proved. Since
the mod(ϕn) are decreasing, we have that mod(ϕn) = ∅, for n ≥ n0. It thus follows that
limn→∞ µ∗(mod(ϕn)) = µ∗(∅) = 0. Hence, by [Dud02, Theorem 3.1.1], µ∗ is countably additive
on BS .
Proposition 31 (µ⇒ µ∗) Let the alphabet be countable, S the set of sentences, I the set of
interpretations, and B the Borel σ-algebra on I. Let µ : S → R be a probability on sentences.
Then there exists a unique probability µ∗ : B → R such that
µ∗(mod(ϕ)) = µ(ϕ),
for each ϕ ∈ S.
Proof. Consider the algebra BS = {mod(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ S}. Define µ∗ : BS → R by
µ∗(mod(ϕ)) = µ(ϕ),
for each ϕ ∈ S. Suppose that ϕ and ψ are sentences such that mod(ϕ) = mod(ψ). Then ϕ = ψ
is valid, and so µ(ϕ) = µ(ψ). This shows that µ∗ is well-defined on basic sets.
Clearly µ∗(I) = µ∗(mod(T )) = µ(T ) = 1.
Next it is shown that µ∗ is finitely additive on the algebra BS . Let {mod(ϕi)}ni=1 be a finite
collection of pairwise disjoint sets in BS . Suppose that, for some i and j, ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj) is not
valid. Hence ϕi ∧ϕj has a model, and so mod(ϕi)∩mod(ϕj) 6= ∅. Thus mod(ϕi)∩mod(ϕj) = ∅
implies ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj) is valid. Then
µ∗(
n⋃
i=1
mod(ϕi)) = µ
∗(mod(
n∨
i=1
ϕi)) = µ(
n∨
i=1
ϕi) =
n∑
i=1
µ(ϕi) =
n∑
i=1
µ∗(mod(ϕi)),
where the second last equality follows from Part 6 of Proposition 19. Thus µ∗ is finitely additive
on BS .
Now, by Proposition 30, µ∗ is countably additive on BS . Since the alphabet is countable,
BS is countable, and so the Borel σ-algebra B generated by the topology on I is the same as
17
the σ-algebra generated by BS . By Caratheodory’s theorem [Dud02, Theorem 3.1.4], there is
a unique extension of µ∗ to the Borel σ-algebra B on I.
A probability µ∗ : B → R on sets of interpretations has the following intended meaning:
For a Borel set B ∈ B, µ∗(B) is the degree of belief that the intended interpretation
is a member of B.
We now consider probabilities defined on sets of separating interpretations. Let Î be the set
of separating interpretations (for the alphabet). A Borel σ-algebra can be defined on Î. For
that, a topology needs to be defined first. For each sentence ϕ, let m̂od(ϕ) denote the set
{I ∈ Î | ϕ is valid in I}.
Consider the set B̂S = {m̂od(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ S}. Since B̂S is closed under finite intersections, it is a
basis for a topology T̂ on Î. B̂S is also an algebra, since it is closed under complementation
and finite unions, and Î ∈ B̂S . Let B̂ be the Borel σ-algebra formed from the topology T̂ on
Î. In the following, probabilities on B̂ will be considered. The Gaifman condition is crucial for
them to be CA, since B̂ is not compact unlike B.
Suppose that the alphabet is countable. Then the set of terms and, in particular, the set
S is countable. In this case, B̂S is countable and hence the σ-algebra generated by B̂S is the
same as the Borel σ-algebra B̂ generated by T̂ .
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of probabilities on B̂ and
the set of probabilities on B which give measure 0 to the set of non-separating interpretations.
(The set of non-separating interpretations, and hence the set of separating interpretations, are
shown to be B-measurable in the proof of Proposition 33 below.) A probability µ̂∗ : B̂ → R can
be extended to a probability µ∗ : B → R defined by µ∗(B) = µ̂∗(B ∩ Î), for each B ∈ B. Note
that µ∗(I \Î) = 0. Conversely, a probability µ∗ : B → R having the property that µ∗(I \Î) = 0
can be restricted to a probability µ∗|B̂ : B̂ → R defined by µ∗|B̂(B) = µ∗(B), for each B ∈ B̂.
The next result shows that a probability on the set of separating interpretations gives a
Gaifman probability on sentences.
Proposition 32 (separating µ∗ ⇒ µ Gaifman) Let the alphabet be countable, S the set of
sentences, Î the set of separating interpretations, and µ∗ : B̂ → R a probability on the Borel
σ-algebra B̂ on Î. Define µ : S → R by
µ(ϕ) = µ∗(m̂od(ϕ)),
for each ϕ ∈ S. Then µ is a Gaifman probability on S.
Proof. First, the two conditions of Definition 17 have to be established. Note that µ is
non-negative because µ∗ is.
1. Suppose that ϕ is valid. Then m̂od(ϕ) = Î, so that µ(ϕ) = µ∗(m̂od(ϕ)) = µ∗(Î) = 1.
2. Suppose that ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) is valid. Hence m̂od(ϕ) ∩ m̂od(ψ) = ∅. Thus
µ(ϕ ∨ ψ)
= µ∗(m̂od(ϕ ∨ ψ))
= µ∗(m̂od(ϕ) ∪ m̂od(ψ))
18
= µ∗(m̂od(ϕ)) + µ∗(m̂od(ψ)) [µ∗ is finitely additive]
= µ(ϕ) + µ(ψ).
Hence µ is a probability.
Let r and s be closed terms of type α→ β and t1, t2, ... an enumeration of all closed terms
of type α. Then
m̂od(r = s) =
∞⋂
i=1
m̂od((r ti) = (s ti)).
To see this, suppose first that I ∈ m̂od(r = s). Then clearly I ∈ m̂od((r ti) = (s ti)), for each
ti. Conversely, suppose that I is a separating interpretation such that I /∈ m̂od(r = s). Since I
is separating, there exists a closed term tj such that I /∈ m̂od((r tj) = (s tj)), for some j. Hence
I /∈ ⋂∞i=1 m̂od((r ti) = (s ti)). [Note, by the way, that mod(r = s) 6= ⋂∞i=1 mod((r ti) = (s ti)).]
Since ∀x.ϕ is logically equivalent to λx.ϕ = λx.T , it follows immediately from the remark
of the preceding paragraph that
m̂od(∀x.ϕ) =
∞⋂
i=1
m̂od(ϕ{x/ti}).
Thus µ(∀x.ϕ) = µ∗(m̂od(∀x.ϕ))
= µ∗(
⋂∞
i=1 m̂od(ϕ{x/ti}))
= limn→∞ µ∗(
⋂n
i=1 m̂od(ϕ{x/ti})) [µ∗ is countably additive]
= limn→∞ µ∗(m̂od(
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}))
= limn→∞ µ(
∧n
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}),
and so µ is Gaifman, by Proposition 23.
A probability µ∗ : B̂ → R on sets of separating interpretations has the following intended
meaning:
For a Borel set B ∈ B̂, µ∗(B) is the degree of belief that the intended (separating)
interpretation is a member of B.
Next we show that a Gaifman probability on sentences gives a probability on separating
interpretations.
Proposition 33 (Gaifman µ⇒ µ∗ separating) Let the alphabet be countable, S the set of
sentences, Î the set of separating interpretations, and B̂ the Borel σ-algebra on Î. Let µ : S → R
be a Gaifman probability on sentences. Then there exists a unique probability µ̂∗ : B̂ → R such
that
µ̂∗(m̂od(ϕ)) = µ(ϕ),
for each ϕ ∈ S.
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Proof. Let I be the set of interpretations. Then I \ Î is the set of all non-separating inter-
pretations. First we show that I \ Î is B-measurable. Let r and s be closed terms of the same
function type, say, α→ β, and t1, t2, ... an enumeration of all closed terms of type α. Then
mod(r 6= s) ∩
∞⋂
i=1
mod((r ti) = (s ti))
is a measurable set of non-separating interpretations. Since there are countably many such
pairs r and s, and since
I \ Î =
⋃
r,s
(
mod(r 6= s) ∩
∞⋂
i=1
mod((r ti) = (s ti))
)
,
it follows immediately that I \ Î is measurable.
According to Proposition 31, there is a unique probability µ∗ : B → R such that
µ∗(mod(ϕ)) = µ(ϕ),
for each ϕ ∈ S. We now show that µ∗(I \ Î) = 0:
µ∗(mod(r 6= s) ∩⋂∞i=1 mod((r ti) = (s ti)))
= µ∗(
⋂∞
i=1 mod((r ti) = (s ti)))− µ∗(mod(r = s))
= limn→∞ µ∗(
⋂n
i=1 mod((r ti) = (s ti)))− µ(r = s) [µ∗ is countably additive]
= limn→∞ µ∗(mod(
∧n
i=1((r ti) = (s ti))))− µ(r = s)
= limn→∞ µ(
∧n
i=1((r ti) = (s ti)))− µ(r = s)
= µ(r = s)− µ(r = s) [µ is Gaifman]
= 0.
Hence µ∗(I \ Î) = 0.
Note that B̂ ⊆ B, since Î is measurable. Define µ̂∗ : B̂ → R to be the restriction of µ∗ to B̂.
Then, for each ϕ ∈ S,
µ̂∗(m̂od(ϕ))
= µ∗(mod(ϕ) ∩ Î)
= µ∗(mod(ϕ))− µ∗(mod(ϕ) ∩ (I \ Î))
= µ∗(mod(ϕ)) [µ∗(I \ Î) = 0]
= µ(ϕ).
Also µ̂∗(Î) = µ∗(Î) = µ∗(I)− µ∗(I \ Î) = µ∗(I) = 1, so that µ̂∗ is a probability.
Propositions 32 and 33 and imply
Corollary 34 (µ∗(I \ Î) = 0 ⇔ µ Gaifman) For countable alphabet and any probability
µ : S → R on sentences and probability µ∗ : B → R on interpretations (one-to-one) related by
µ∗(mod(ϕ)) = µ(ϕ) it holds that: µ∗(I \ Î) = 0⇔ µ Gaifman.
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There is a concept of being strongly Cournot for probabilities on sets of interpretations that
corresponds to that of being strongly Cournot for probabilities on sentences.
Definition 35 (strongly Cournot µ∗) A probability µ∗ : B → R is strongly Cournot if, for
each ϕ ∈ S, ϕ is satisfiable implies µ∗(mod(ϕ)) > 0.
Proposition 36 (strongly Cournot µ∗ ⇔ µ) Let S be the set of sentences and I the set
of interpretations. Suppose that µ∗ : B → R, a probability on the Borel σ-algebra on I, and
µ : S → R, a probability on sentences, are related by
µ(ϕ) = µ∗(mod(ϕ)),
for each ϕ ∈ S. Then µ is a strongly Cournot probability on sentences iff µ∗ is a strongly
Cournot probability on sets of interpretations.
Proof. Suppose that µ is a strongly Cournot probability on sentences. Let ϕ be a satisfiable
sentence. Then µ∗(mod(ϕ)) = µ(ϕ) > 0, and so µ∗ is a strongly Cournot probability.
Conversely, suppose that µ∗ is a strongly Cournot probability on sets of interpretations.
Let ϕ be a satisfiable sentence. Then µ(ϕ) = µ∗(mod(ϕ)) > 0, and so µ is a strongly Cournot
probability.
As with probabilities on sentences, we can also define a Cournot condition for probabilities
on sets of separated interpretations.
Definition 37 (Cournot µ∗) A probability µ∗ : B → R is Cournot if, for each ϕ ∈ S, ϕ has
a separating model implies µ∗(mod(ϕ)) > 0.
Clearly every strongly Cournot probability is Cournot.
Proposition 38 (Cournot µ∗ ⇔ µ) Let S be the set of sentences and I the set of interpre-
tations. Suppose that µ∗ : B → R, a probability on the Borel σ-algebra B on I, and µ : S → R,
a probability on sentences, are related by
µ(ϕ) = µ∗(mod(ϕ)),
for each ϕ ∈ S. Then µ is a Cournot probability on sentences iff µ∗ is a Cournot probability
on sets of interpretations.
Proof. Suppose that µ is a Cournot probability on sentences. Let ϕ be a sentence having a
separating model. Then µ∗(mod(ϕ)) = µ(ϕ) > 0, and so µ∗ is a Cournot probability.
Conversely, suppose that µ∗ is a Cournot probability on sets of interpretations. Let ϕ be
a sentence having a separating model. Then µ(ϕ) = µ∗(mod(ϕ)) > 0, and so µ is a Cournot
probability.
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5 Existence of Probabilities
Now we turn to the issue of the existence of probabilities.
Definition 39 (discrete µ∗) A probability µ∗ : B → R is discrete if there exists a count-
able set of interpretations {Ii}∞i=1 and a set of non-negative real numbers {mi}∞i=1 such that∑∞
i=1 mi = 1 and, for each Borel set B, µ
∗(B) =
∑
i:Ii∈Bmi.
Each mi is called a mass. Clearly, a discrete probability is a probability on the Borel
σ-algebra B. The set {Ii}∞i=1 is called the support of the probability.
Theorem 40 (Cournot and Gaifman probability) If the alphabet is countable, there ex-
ists a probability on sentences that is Cournot and Gaifman.
Proof. Consider an enumeration χ1, χ2, ... of the countable set of sentences which have a
separating model. Choose a separating interpretation Ii in mod(χi) and assign the mass mi =
1
i(i+1)
to Ii, for i = 1, 2, ... .
Define µ∗ : B → R to be the discrete probability defined by the masses assigned to this
countable set of interpretations. That is, for a Borel set B ∈ B, µ∗(B) = ∑i:Ii∈B 1i(i+1) is the
sum of the masses of the subset of separating interpretations in {Ii}∞i=1 that are members of
B. It is possible that the same interpretation is chosen for more than one mod(χi); in this
case, the masses corresponding to each choice of that interpretation are added together. µ∗ is
a probability, since it is a countable sum of point masses, and µ∗(I) = ∑∞i=1 1i(i+1) = 1. Since,
for all i, µ∗(mod(χi)) ≥ 1i(i+1) > 0, µ∗ is Cournot.
Now define µ : S → R by µ(ϕ) = µ∗(mod(ϕ)), for ϕ ∈ S. By Proposition 29, µ is a
probability on sentences. Also, by Proposition 38, µ is Cournot. Finally, note that, if I is
the set of interpretations and Î the set of separating interpretations, then µ∗(I \ Î) = 0.
Consequently, the restriction of µ∗ to B̂ is a probability on B̂ and µ(ϕ) = µ∗(m̂od(ϕ)), for
ϕ ∈ S. Thus, by Proposition 32, µ is Gaifman.
Note that the support of the discrete probability µ∗ constructed in Theorem 40 is a dense
subset of Î, since there is a point from the support of the probability in each set in a basis for
its topology. Every class of separating models that can be characterized by a finite number of
axioms can also be characterized by a single sentence, hence is assigned a non-zero probability.
Proposition 41 (strongly Cournot probability) If the alphabet is countable, there exists
a probability on sentences that is strongly Cournot.
Proof. Consider an enumeration χ1, χ2, ... of the countable set of sentences which have a model.
Choose an interpretation Ii in mod(χi) and assign the mass
1
i(i+1)
to Ii, for i = 1, 2, ... .
Define µ∗ : B → R to be the discrete probability defined by µ∗(B) = ∑i:Ii∈B 1i(i+1) for B ∈ B.
µ∗ is a probability, since it is a countable sum of point masses, and µ∗(I) = ∑∞i=1 1i(i+1) = 1.
Since, for all i, µ∗(mod(χi)) ≥ 1i(i+1) > 0, µ∗ is strongly Cournot.
Now define µ : S → R by µ(ϕ) = µ∗(mod(ϕ)), for ϕ ∈ S. By Proposition 29, µ is a
probability on sentences. Also, by Proposition 36, µ is strongly Cournot.
Now we give some illustrative examples concerning the various classes of probabilities that
have been introduced.
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Example 42 (a probability which is not Gaifman) Choose an alphabet for which there
exists a non-separating interpretation. Construct µ∗ by putting unit mass on some non-
separating interpretation. The probability on sentences corresponding to µ∗ is not Gaifman
by Corollary 34.
Here is such an alphabet and interpretation. Let there be no non-logical constants in the
alphabet. Let the interpretation I be the standard model defined as follows. The domain
Dı = {d}. Each Dα→β consists of all functions from Dα to Dβ. Note that d is not the
denotation of any closed term of type ı. Now consider λx.> and λx.⊥, each having type ı→ o.
Clearly V(λx.>, I) 6= V(λx.⊥, I). However, there does not exist a closed term t of type ı such
that V((λx.> t), I) 6= V((λx.⊥ t), I). Hence I is not a separating interpretation. ♦
Theorem 40 shows that, for any countable alphabet, there is always a probability which
is Cournot and Gaifman. The next example shows that it is not guaranteed that there is a
probability which is strongly Cournot and Gaifman, because these two concepts may conflict
on non-separating interpretations.
Example 43 (a probability which is strongly Cournot but not Gaifman) Choose an
alphabet for which there exists a non-separating interpretation. Construct µ∗ by forming an
enumeration ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . of all satisfiable sentences, and putting mass
1
2
on some non-separating
interpretation and for each i mass 1
(i+1)(i+2)
on an interpretation in mod(ϕi). The probability
on sentences corresponding to µ∗ is strongly Cournot, but not Gaifman. ♦
Example 44 (a probability which is Gaifman but not Cournot) Choose an alphabet
for which there exist two disjoint sentences each having a separating model. Construct µ∗ by
putting unit mass on a separating model of one of the sentences. The probability on sentences
corresponding to µ∗ is Gaifman but not Cournot.
Here is such alphabet and pair of sentences. Let d be any element, Dı = {d}, and, for
definiteness, each domain Dα→β the set of all functions from Dα to Dβ. Each of the domains
Dα is finite. Let there be a non-logical constant a of type ı such that V (a) = d. The domain
Dı→o consists of two functions, one that maps d to T and is the denotation of λx.>, and one
that maps d to F and is the denotation of λx.⊥. For each element of each of the domains Dα→β
(other than Dı→o) introduce a non-logical constant of a suitable type into the alphabet in such a
way that the denotation of the constant is the corresponding function. Note that every element
of every domain is the denotation of a closed term. Now introduce a non-logical constant p of
type ı → o. For the interpretation I1, take everything defined so far and give p the denotation
d 7→ T. Then I1 is a separating model of the sentence (p a). On the other hand, for the
interpretation I2 take everything defined so far except give p the denotation d 7→ F. Then I2 is
a separating model of the sentence ¬(p a). Finally, note that (p a) and ¬(p a) are disjoint.
Example 46 below provides another such alphabet and sentence, but with infinite domain
Dı = {0, 1, 2, ...}: There, ∀x.(B x) and ¬∀x.(B x) each have a separating model, say Î and
Î ′. Hence we can set µ∗(Î ′) = 1, which implies µ(∀x.(B x)) = 0 and so µ cannot confirm
∀x.(B x). Note that µ is Gaifman by Corollary 34 but not Cournot. ♦
Example 45 (a probability which is Cournot but not strongly Cournot) Choose an
alphabet for which there is a sentence having a non-empty set of models all of which are non-
separating. Construct µ∗ by forming an enumeration ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . of all sentences that have a
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separating model and putting mass 1
i(i+1)
on a separating interpretation in mod(ϕi), for each i.
The probability on sentences corresponding to µ∗ is Cournot but not strongly Cournot.
Here is such an alphabet and sentence. Let the alphabet contain the non-logical constants
a of type ı and p of type ı → o. Consider the sentence ϕ ≡ ∃x.(¬(p x) ∧ (p a)), which has a
model. Let I be any model for ϕ. Then for I the domain Dı must have at least two elements,
one of which is the denotation of a and where none of the others is the denotation of a closed
term of type ı. Clearly V(p, I) 6= V(λx.>, I). However, there does not exist a closed term t
of type ı such that V((p t), I) 6= V((λx.> t), I). Hence I is not a separating interpretation. ♦
Example 46 (standard interpretation of Nat) This continues Example 24. As non-
logical constants in our theory we consider 0 : Nat and S : Nat → Nat, and abbreviate
n ≡ Sn(0) = (S (S (S · · · (S 0)))). The standard interpretation I is defined as follows:
The domain DNat = {0, 1, 2, ...}, and each domain Dα→β is the set of all functions from
Dα to Dβ. We interpret V(n, I) = n and V (S) : DNat → DNat is the successor function
mapping n to n + 1. This interpretation satisfies the Peano axioms ∀x.(S x) 6= 0 and
∀x.∀y.((S x) = (S y)) → (x = y) and ∀p.(((p 0) ∧ ∀x.((p x) → (p (S x)))) → ∀x.(p x)).
We can add to our logic any number of constants of type Nat → o. Let J be the set of
interpretations obtained by augmenting I with any valuation of these new constants. Every
interpretation in J (still) satisfies the Peano axioms. Here and in later examples we only add
one such predicate B : Nat → o, used for induction. For any probability µ∗ that concentrates
on J , i.e. µ∗(J ) = 1, µ(∀x.(ϕ x)) = limn→∞ µ((ϕ 0) ∧ ... ∧ (ϕ n)) holds for every closed term
ϕ of type Nat→ o, and in particular for B. ♦
Example 47 (non-standard interpretation of Nat) Consider Example 46 and modify the
interpretation I to I ′ as follows: Expand DNat to DNat = {0, 1, 2, ...} ∪ {...,−2˜,−1˜, 0˜, 1˜, 2˜, ...}
and V (S) mapping n˜ 7→ n˜+1 in addition to n 7→ n + 1. We call n˜ ∈ {...,−2˜,−1˜, 0˜, 1˜, 2˜, ...},
non-standard numbers. As before, augment I ′ by an interpretation of B. Here we only
consider valuations V (B) that are true everywhere, except on a single non-standard number,
say c˜. This leads to a non-separating interpretation I ′, since ∃x.¬(B x) is valid in I ′ but
there is no closed term t for which ¬(B t) is. Note that every closed term of type Nat
has some standard number n as denotation. For a point probability µ∗ that concentrates
on I ′ we therefore have µ(∀x.(B x)) = 0 but µ((B t)) = 1 for all closed terms t of type
Nat. Hence µ is not Gaifman and cannot confirm ∀x.(B x). Note that I ′ even satisfies the
“Peano” axioms if either ∀p is replaced by “for all closed terms p of type Nat → o” or a
suitable subset of {T,F}DNat is chosen for DNat→o. (this is due to the absence of + and ×). ♦
Example 48 (the description operator ι) We can use the previous Example 47 to
illustrate the complications a description operator ι causes. Let constant ι(Nat→o)→Nat de-
note a function that selects the unique member of a singleton set ((ι (λx.(y = x))) = y).
Since V((ι ¬B), I ′) = c˜, (ι ¬B) = n is not valid in I ′ for any standard number, and
µ(B (ι ¬B)) = 0. Indeed, ι makes accessible all non-standard numbers via c˜+k = Sk(ι ¬B)
and c˜−k = (ι λx.(¬B Sk(x))). Hence I ′ is now separating for type Nat and all non-standard
numbers must be included in the enumeration of terms in the Gaifman condition, even if
we only care about the standard interpretation. We do not know how to avoid this problem,
e.g. adding additional axioms that constrain ι. On the other hand, ι can easily be eliminated
24
from the logic (the basic idea is that formulas like (p (ι B)) can be replaced by something like
(∃!x.(B x) ∧ (p x)) ∨ (¬∃!x.(B x) ∧ (p 0))). ♦
At least asymptotically, the Cournot and Gaifman probabilities constructed in the proof of
Theorem 40 are good priors for sentences, since they are non-dogmatic [GS82]. We will use
them in Sections 6 and 7, called ξ there, to construct minimally more informative distributions
given some background knowledge like non-logical axioms.
After having seen various examples of (non)Cournot and (non)Gaifman probabilities, we
now give a general characterization of Gaifman and Cournot probabilities.
Definition 49 (rigid mixture representation) Let χ1, χ2, ... be an enumeration of all sen-
tences that have a separating model. We say that a probability µ : S → R on sentences has
a mixture representation iff µ(ϕ) =
∑∞
i=1miµi(ϕ) for some {mi > 0} and
∑
imi = 1 and
probabilities µi satisfying µi(χi) = 1 (hence µi(¬χi) = 0).
Theorem 50 (probability characterization - Gaifman and Cournot)
Let µ be a probability on sentences. Then
µ is Cournot
(and Gaifman)
⇔ µ has a rigid mixture representation
(and all µi in Definition 49 are Gaifman)
This result eases the construction of Cournot µ, in that it reduces the problem of finding
a single µ that simultaneously satisfies the infinitely many conditions µ(χi) > 0 ∀χi to the
problem of finding infinitely many probabilities µi with each only satisfying one constraint
µi(χi) > 0.
For instance, as in the proof of Theorem 40, for any Ii ∈ m̂od(χi), µi(ϕ) := [[Ii ∈ m̂od(ϕ)]]
satisfies µi(χi) = 1. This also shows that some Cournot (and Gaifman) µ can be built purely
from deterministic measures µi ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. sets of models. Corollary 53 below illustrates more
generally how Theorem 50 can help.
Proof. With the notation of Definition 49 we have:
(Cournot⇐) Assume ϕ has a separating model.
Then ϕ = χi for some i, and hence µ(ϕ) = µ(χi) ≥ miµi(χi) > 0.
(&Gaifman⇐) A linear combination µ of Gaifman µi is itself Gaifman.
(Cournot⇒) Consider N-partition
T := {i ∈ N : µ(χi) = 1},
E := {i 6∈ T : χi starts with an even (incl. zero) number of negations ¬},
O := {i 6∈ T : χi starts with an odd number of negations ¬}.
and let c : E → O biject χc(i) = ¬χi. Let ϕ be an arbitrary sentence.
For i ∈ E : µ(ϕ) = µ(ϕ|χi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:µi(ϕ)
µ(χi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:pi>0
+µ(ϕ|¬χi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:µc(i)(ϕ)
µ(¬χi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−pi>0
Let
∑
i∈E ri = 1 and ri > 0 and mi =
1
2
ripi > 0 and mc(i) =
1
2
ri(1− pi) > 0 for i ∈ E . Then
µ(ϕ) =
∑
i∈E
riµ(ϕ) =
∑
i∈E
ri[piµi(ϕ) + (1− pi)µc(i)(ϕ)] =
∑
i∈E∪˙O
2miµi(ϕ)
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For i ∈ T define µi(ϕ) := µ(ϕ) ≡ µ(ϕ|χi) and
∑
i∈T mi =
1
2
with mi > 0. Then µ(ϕ) =∑
i∈T 2miµi(ϕ). Adding both representations gives
µ = 1
2
[µ+ µ] = 1
2
[
∑
i∈E∪˙O
2miµi(ϕ) +
∑
i∈T
2miµi(ϕ)] =
∞∑
i=1
miµi
with
∑∞
i=1mi = 1, mi > 0, µi(χi) = 1 as needed.
(&Gaifman⇒) µ Gaifman implies µi = µ(·|χi) Gaifman.
The next theorem is a complete characterization of general and (strongly) Cournot or Gaif-
man probabilities on sentences. It is based on a tree construction: Consider a sequence of (some
or all) sentences ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ..., arranged in a finite or infinite complete binary tree with all left
(right) children at depth n labeled by ¬ϕn (ϕn) as depicted below. Furthermore, each node
stores the µ-probability of the conjunction ψn,S of sentences along the edges from the root to
this node.
ψ0,∅ ≡ >r¬ϕ1
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Proposition 51 (ψSϕ-tree) For i = 1, ..., n, let ϕi be a sentence. For each S ⊆ {1 : n} ≡
{1, ..., n}, define the sentence ψn,S by
ψn,S ≡ (
∧
i∈S
ϕi) ∧ (
∧
j∈{1:n}\S
¬ϕj).
Then the following hold.
1. The ψn,S’s are pairwise disjoint.
2.
∨
S⊆{1:n} ψn,S is valid.
3. For each i = 1, ..., n, ϕi is logically equivalent to
∨
S⊆{1:n}:i∈S
ψn,S.
Proof. Straightforward.
The following is our main characterization theorem. It states necessary and sufficient condi-
tions on the labels αn,S := µ(ψn,S), for general µ, as well as (strongly) Cournot µ, and sufficient
conditions for Gaifman µ. We do not yet have a complete tree characterization of Gaifman
probabilities, which is a major open problem. The characterization can easily be converted to a
procedure that assigns probabilities to one sentence after the other, but it is not an algorithm,
since satisfiability is not decidable.
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Theorem 52 (tree characterization of general/Cournot/Gaifman probabilities) Let
the alphabet be countable and ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ... an enumeration of all sentences. For each n ≥ 1
and each S ⊆ {1:n}, define the sentence ψn,S by
ψn,S ≡ (
∧
i∈S
ϕi) ∧ (
∧
j∈{1:n}\S
¬ϕj).
1. Let µ be a probability on sentences. Then, for each n ≥ 1,
µ(ϕn) =
∑
S⊆{1:n}:n∈S
µ(ψn,S). (1)
Furthermore, µ is Cournot (resp., strongly Cournot) iff, for each n ≥ 1 and S ⊆ {1 :n},
ψn,S has a separating model (resp., is satisfiable) implies µ(ψn,S) > 0.
2. For each n ≥ 1 and S ⊆ {1:n}, let αn,S ∈ R satisfy the following conditions.
(a) αn,S ≥ 0.
(b) If ψn,S is unsatisfiable, then αn,S = 0.
(c) αn,S = αn+1,S + αn+1,S∪{n+1}.
(d)
∑
S⊆{1:n} αn,S = 1.
Then there exists a probability µ on sentences such that, for each n ≥ 1 and each S ⊆
{1:n},
µ(ψn,S) = αn,S.
3. Suppose that, in addition to the conditions in Part 2, the following condition also holds:
for each n ≥ 1 and S ⊆ {1 :n}, ψn,S has a separating model (resp., is satisfiable) implies
αn,S > 0. Then µ is Cournot (resp., strongly Cournot).
4. Suppose that, the conditions of Part 2 hold. Strengthen 2b by demanding that if ψn,S has
no separating model, then αn,S = 0. Further, assume that enumeration ϕ1, ϕ2, ... is such
that if ϕn+1 = [r = s] for terms r and s having the same function type, then ϕn+2 =∨
S⊆{1:n} ψn,S ∧ ϕ{x/tS}, where ϕ := [(r x) = (s x)] and tS is such that ψn,S ∧ ¬ϕ{x/tS}
has a separating model (if no such tS exists, choose tS arbitrarily or drop this contribution
from
∨
). For ϕn+1 = [r = s] also set αn+2,S = αn+1,S. Then µ is Gaifman.
5. For every probability µ, αn,S := µ(ψn,S) satisfies 2(a)-(d).
Items 1,2,3,and 5 are rather natural. The somewhat ugly item 4 requires explanation: First,
the assumption on the enumeration ϕi can easily be satisfied by inserting appropriate ϕn+2 at
the required n. The intuition behind the construction for n = 0 is that if I is a model of ¬ϕ1,
i.e. of ∃x.¬ϕ, Gaifman requires a witness t, which exists by the extensionality axiom. We can
guarantee such a witness by putting ϕ2 = ϕ{x/t} and following exclusively the ¬ϕ2 branch by
setting α2,{2} = 0. For general n, the witnesses t and hence ϕn+2 = ϕ{x/t} may depend on S;
this would lead to a branch-dependent enumeration of sentences. There is nothing wrong with
this, and is probably even the preferred solution. In order to keep things simple, we kept the
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enumeration branch independent by or-ing ϕn+2 over all 2
n branches, which makes it formally
independent of the branch S.
Proof. 1. The first part follows immediately from Parts 1 and 3 of Proposition 51 and
Proposition 19.6.
The second part for strongly Cournot follows immediately from the definition of a strongly
Cournot probability, Proposition 51.3, and Proposition 19.4: That strongly Cournot implies
µ(ψn,S) > 0 for satisfiable ψn,S is trivial. For the other direction, ϕn is satisfiable implies that
there exists an S 3 n for which ψn,S is satisfiable. Hence µ(ϕn) ≥ µ(ψn,S) > 0. Thus µ(ϕ) > 0,
for all satisfiable ϕ, and so µ is strongly Cournot. The proof for the Cournot case is similar.
2. First define µ0 : {ψn,S}n≥1,S⊆{1:n} → R by
µ0(ψn,S) = αn,S,
for each n ≥ 1 and S ⊆ {1:n}. We prove by induction that, for m ≥ n,
µ0(ψn,S) =
∑
R:S⊆R⊆S∪{n+1,...,m}
αm,R.
The result is obvious when m = n. Suppose now it holds for m. Then
µ0(ψn,S)
=
∑
R:S⊆R⊆S∪{n+1,...,m} αm,R [Induction hypothesis]
=
∑
R:S⊆R⊆S∪{n+1,...,m}(αm+1,R + αm+1,R∪{m+1})
=
∑
R:S⊆R⊆S∪{n+1,...,m+1} αm+1,R.
This completes the induction argument.
Now define µ : S → R by
µ(ϕn) =
∑
S⊆{1:n}:n∈S
αn,S.
for each n ≥ 1. We prove by induction that, for m ≥ n,
µ(ϕn) =
∑
S⊆{1:m}:n∈S
αm,S.
The result is obvious when m = n. Suppose now it holds for m. Then
µ(ϕn)
=
∑
S⊆{1:m}:n∈S αm,S [Induction hypothesis]
=
∑
S⊆{1:n}:n∈S(αm+1,S + αm+1,S∪{m+1})
=
∑
S⊆{1:m+1}:n∈S αm+1,S.
This completes the induction argument.
We show that µ extends µ0. Suppose that ψn,S, for some n ≥ 1 and S ⊆ {1 : n}, is ϕk,
for some k ≥ 1. Let m = max{k, n} and A = {R : k ∈ R ⊆ {1, ...,m}} and B = {R : S ⊆
R ⊆ S ∪ {n + 1, ...,m}}. Then ∨R∈A ψm,R is logically equivalent to ϕk which is equal to ψn,S
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which is logically equivalent to
∨
R∈B ψm,R. Also the ψm,R are pairwise disjoint. Hence ψm,R is
unsatisfiable (and so αm,R = 0) for each R ∈ (A \ B) ∪ (B \ A). This implies
µ(ψn,S) = µ(ϕk) =
∑
R∈A
αm,R =
∑
R∈B
αm,R = µ0(ψn,S).
In summary, µ : S → R is well-defined and satisfies
µ(ϕn) =
∑
S⊆{1:n}:n∈S
µ(ψn,S),
for each n ≥ 1.
We show that µ is a probability. Clearly, µ is non-negative. Now suppose that, for some
n ≥ 1, ϕn is valid.
Then, for n 6∈ S, ψn,S is a conjunction that contains ¬ϕn, hence is not satisfiable and
therefore αn,S = 0 for n 6∈ S. This implies
µ(ϕn) =
∑
S⊆{1:n}:n∈S
αn,S =
∑
S⊆{1:n}
αn,S = 1.
Finally, suppose that ¬(ϕn∧ϕm) is valid. There exists k ≥ 1 such ϕk is ϕn∨ϕm. Choose any
p greater than n, m and k. Consider A := {S ⊆ {1:p} : k ∈ S} and B := {S ⊆ {1:p} : n ∈ S}
and C := {S ⊆ {1:p} : m ∈ S}.
αp,S = 0 for S ∈ B ∩ C, since ψn,S is a conjunction containing ϕn ∧ ϕm.
αp,S = 0 for A \ (B ∪ C), since ψn,S is a conjunction containing ϕk ∧ ¬ϕn ∧ ¬ϕm.
αp,S = 0 for (B ∪ C) \ A, since ψn,S is a conjunction containing ¬ϕk ∧ ϕn ∧ ϕm.
Together this implies
µ(ϕn ∨ ϕm) = µ(ϕk) =
∑
S∈A
αp,S =
∑
S∈B
αp,S +
∑
S∈C
αp,S = µ(ϕn) + µ(ϕm).
Thus µ is a probability on sentences.
3. For the strongly Cournot case, suppose that, for some n ≥ 1, ϕn is satisfiable. Thus
ψn,S′ is satisfiable for some S
′ ⊆ {1 : n} for which n ∈ S ′. By the condition, µ(ψn,S′) > 0.
Hence µ(ϕn) =
∑
S⊆{1:n}:n∈S µ(ψn,S) > 0. The Cournot case is similar.
4. ∃x.ϕ has separating model (s.m.) iff there exists t such that ϕ{x/t} has s.m. The ⇒
direction follows from Definition 12 with r = λx.ϕ and s = λx.>. The ⇐ direction follows
from ϕ{x/t} → ∃x.ϕ.
We need to show the Gaifman condition in Definition 20. This is equivalent to: For all
terms r and s having the same function type, µ(r = s) = limm→∞ µ(
∧m
i=1((r ti) = (s ti))).
Fix r and s, define ϕ := [(r x) = (s x)]. Using the extensionality axiom we hence have to show
µ(∀x.ϕ) = lim
m→∞
µ(
m∧
i=1
ϕ{x/ti})
Consider n such that ϕn+1 = [r = s] ≡ ∀x.ϕ. By assumption, ϕn+2 =
∨
S⊆{1:n} ψn,S ∧ ϕ{x/tS}.
We first prove that setting αn+2,S = αn+1,S is allowed:
Assume ψn,S ∧ ¬ϕn+1 ≡ ∃x.(ψn,S ∧ ¬ϕ) has s.m.
⇒ There exists tS s.th. ψn,S ∧ ¬ϕ{x/tS} has s.m.
⇒ ψn,S ∧ ¬ϕn+1 ∧ ¬ϕ{x/tS} has s.m., since ¬ϕ{x/tS} implies ¬ϕn+1.
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The last expression is logically equivalent to ψn,S ∧ ¬ϕn+1 ∧ ¬ϕn+2, since for ψn,S = ⊥, both
expressions are false, and for ψn,S = >, ψn,S′ = ⊥ for all S ′ 6= S, hence
∨
S in ϕn+2 collapses to
ϕ{x/tS}. Since ψn,S ∧ ¬ϕn+1 ∧ ¬ϕn+2 has s.m., αn+2,S = αn+1,S is allowed. Assume now that
ψn,S ∧ ¬ϕn+1 has no s.m. Then ψn,S ∧ ¬ϕn+1 ∧ ¬ϕn+2 has neither, and αn+2,S = αn+1,S = 0.
Hence (4.) is a consistent instantiation of (2.) and generates a probability on sentences µ with
µ(ψn′,S′) = αn′,S′ for all n
′ and S ′. We now prove that it is Gaifman.
For µ(∀x.ϕ ∧ ψn,S) > 0, trivially
µ(
m∧
i=1
ϕ{x/ti} | ∀x.ϕ ∧ ψn,S) = 1 = µ(∀x.ϕ | ∀x.ϕ ∧ ψn,S)
For µ(¬∀x.ϕ ∧ ψn,S) > 0 and sufficiently large m,
µ(
m∧
i=1
ϕ{x/ti} | ¬∀x.ϕ ∧ ψn,S) = 0 = µ(∀x.ϕ | ¬∀x.ϕ ∧ ψn,S)
since µ(¬ϕ{x/tS}|¬∀x.ϕ ∧ ψn,S) = µ(¬ϕn+2|¬∀x.ϕ ∧ ψn,S) = αn+2,S/αn+1,S = 1, and∧m
i=1 ϕ{x/ti} will eventually contradict ¬ϕ{x/tS}.
Since both displayed equalities hold for all S ⊆ {1 :n}, for sufficiently large m this implies
µ(
∧m
i=1 ϕ{x/ti}) = µ(∀x.ϕ).
5. Straightforward.
Unfortunately items 3 and 4 in Theorem 52 cannot be combined. The µ in item 4. is not
Cournot, since e.g. ¬ϕn+1 ∧ ϕn+2 has a separating model if there is more than one possible
witness tS, but is assigned zero probability. We can do something else though.
The following corollary boosts Gaifman µ constructed in Theorem 52.4 with the rigid mix-
ture representation to a Gaifman and Cournot µ, and this without having to choose interpre-
tations I as required in Theorem 50.
Corollary 53 (Gaifman and Cournot probability) Let χ1, χ2, ... be an enumeration of all
sentences that have a separating model. For each i, let ϕ1 := χi, ϕ2, ϕ3, ... be different (in the
first sentence) enumerations of all sentences, and µi be a corresponding Gaifman probability
constructed in Theorem 52.4, choosing µi(χi) ≡ α1,{1} := 1. Then by Theorem 50, the rigid
mixture µ of Definition 49 is Gaifman and Cournot.
6 Relative Entropy of Probabilities on Sentences
Assume we “know” the probabilities µ0(ϕi) of sentences ϕ1, ..., ϕn. Note that µ0 : {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} →
[0, 1] is not a probability on all sentences, but only a partial specification. In the next section
(Proposition 57) we derive conditions under which µ0 can be extended to a probability over all
sentences.
However, if there are any solutions at all, then there are many. It then makes sense to ask
whether some distributions that meet our constraints are “better”, in some sense, than others.
A natural idea is to choose µ in such a way as to be “as uninformative as possible”, con-
sistent with our constraints as defined by µ0. Unfortunately it is not possible to define “as
uninformative as possible” in absolute terms, but we can define it relative to a prior distri-
bution, ξ. We will formalise this using the concept of relative entropy, or Kullback-Leibler
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divergence. We now show that this selection of µ has exactly the form of a piecewise re-scaled
ξ, and show how to find the optimal rescaling constants, the various αS introduced in the next
section, under this criterion. Natural choices for the prior ξ are the non-dogmatic probabilities
constructed in Theorem 40.
We start by introducing the relevant concepts on general measure spaces before constructing
the new distribution µ that meets our constraints while being uninformative relative to our
prior, ξ.
From [Iha93, p.21][Csi75]: Let µ∗ and ξ∗ be probabilities on a measurable space (X,B(X)).
We say that µ∗ is absolutely continuous with respect to ξ∗, µ∗ ≺ ξ∗, if µ∗(A) = 0 for every
A ∈ B(X) such that ξ∗(A) = 0. By the Radon-Nikodym theorem [Dud02, Theorem 5.5.4], if
µ∗ is absolutely continuous with respect to ξ∗, then there exists a ξ∗-integrable function ψ(x)
such that
µ∗(A) =
∫
A
ψ(x)dξ∗(x), ∀A ∈ B(X).
The function ψ(x) is called the Radon-Nikodym derivative and is written in the form
ψ(x) =
dµ∗
dξ∗
(x).
For probabilities µ∗ and ξ∗ on (X,B(X)), the relative entropy KL(µ∗||ξ∗) of µ∗ with respect
to ξ∗ is defined by
KL(µ∗||ξ∗) :=
{∫
X
log dµ
∗
dξ∗ (x)dµ
∗(x) if µ∗ ≺ ξ∗,
∞ otherwise.
The measure ξ∗ is referred to as the reference measure.
By reference to this general definition for relative entropy, we can define the relative entropy
for probabilities on sentences in two ways:
Definition 54 (relative entropy on sentences) For a countable alphabet and for probabili-
ties µ and ξ defined on some set of sentences S, the relative entropy KL(µ||ξ) of µ with respect
to ξ is defined by
KL(µ||ξ) := lim
n→∞
∑
S⊆{1:n}
µ(ψS) log
µ(ψS)
ξ(ψS)
= KL(µ∗||ξ∗)
where 0 log 0
ξ
:= 0 and µ log µ
0
:= ∞ if µ > 0. The last equality holds true if µ∗ and ξ∗ are the
probabilities in Proposition 31 on interpretations that correspond to µ and ξ respectively.
The first definition is more general and useful and conceptually easier. Since the relative
entropy increases with refinement, the limit always exists and is independent of the order of
enumeration of sentences. The second definition is the “obvious” choice for a definition, but is
more restrictive and based on much heavier machinery. Equivalence follows from exchanging
limits with integrals, which requires some justification.
Proof. (sketch) (i) Order independence: Let Φ be a finite set of sentences, and KLΦ(µ||ξ) be
the relative entropy of the sentences in Φ. Then by the monotonicity of the relative entropy
under refinement, Φ ⊆ Φ′ implies KLΦ ≤ KLΦ′ . It is now routine to establish independence of
the limit on the order of enumeration of the sentences.
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(ii) Equivalence of both definitions: For µ∗ 6≺ ξ∗ one can show that the limit diverges, which
implies equality. We will only prove the interesting case when µ∗ ≺ ξ∗. Let ϕ1, ϕ2, ... be an
enumeration of all sentences. For an interpretation I ∈ I, let S be such that ψn,S is valid in I, i.e.
S ≡ S(n, I) := {i ∈ {1, ..., n} : I ∈ mod(ϕi)}. Using µ(ψn,S) = µ∗(mod(ψn,S)) =
∫
mod(ψn,S)
dµ∗,
let
KLn(µ||ξ) :=
∑
S⊆{1:n}
µ(ψn,S) log
µ(ψn,S)
ξ(ψn,S)
=
∫
I
log
µ(ψn,S)
ξ(ψn,S)
dµ∗ ≥ 0
KL∗(µ||ξ) :=
∫
I
log
dµ∗
dξ∗
dµ∗ ≥ 0
Elementary algebra (telescoping property of KL) allows us to split KL∗ into a finitary and a
tail part
KL∗(µ||ξ) = KLn(µ||ξ) +
∑
S⊆{1:n}
µ(ψn,S) KL
∗(µ(·|ψn,S) || ξ(·|ψn,S))
which shows that KL∗ ≥ KLn.
For the other direction, let Fn be the Borel σ-algebra generated by {mod(ψn,S) : S ⊆ {1:n}}.
Then F1 ⊆ F2 ⊆ ... is a filtration with F∞ = B the Borel σ-algebra generated by
⋃∞
n=1Fn.
Define
Zn(I) :=
µ∗(mod(ψn,S))
ξ∗(mod(ψn,S))
=
µ(ψn,S)
ξ(ψn,S)
Zn : I → R is an Fn measurable function, well-defined with ξ-probability 1 (w.ξ.p.1). Z1, Z2, ...
forms a ξ-martingale sequence, since
Eξ[Zn+1|Fn] = µ(ψn+1,S)
ξ(ψn+1,S)
ξ(ψn+1,S|ψn,S) + µ(ψn+1,S∪{n+1})
ξ(ψn+1,S∪{n+1})
ξ(ψn+1,S∪{n+1}|ψn,S)
=
µ(ψn,S)
ξ(ψn,S)
= Zn
Since µ∗ ≺ ξ∗, by [Doo53, VII§8] the sequence converges to the Radon-Nikodym derivative
lim
n→∞
Zn =
dµ∗
dξ∗
w.ξ.p.1
Now consider
KLn(µ||ξ) =
∑
S⊆{1:n}
µ(ψn,S)
ξ(ψn,S)
log
µ(ψn,S)
ξ(ψn,S)
ξ(ψn,S) =
∫
I
Zn logZn dξ
∗
By Fatou’s lemma applied to 1 + Zn logZn, which is non-negative, and the existence of the
pointwise limit Zn w.ξ.p.1, we get
lim inf
n→∞
KLn(µ||ξ) ≥
∫
I
lim inf
n→∞
Zn logZn dξ
∗
=
∫
I
dµ∗
dξ∗
log
dµ∗
dξ∗
dξ∗ =
∫
I
log
dµ∗
dξ∗
dµ∗ = KL∗(µ||ξ)
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Since KLn is monotone increasing and together with KL
∗ ≥ KLn, we have limn→∞KLn = KL∗.
This shows the equivalence of both definitions in Definition 54.
Given some base measure ξ∗, we are interested in finding a measure µ̂∗ that minimizes
KL(µ∗||ξ∗) under some
constraints
∫
X
fi(x)dµ̂
∗(x) = ai, i = 1, ..., n. (2)
We assume that these constraints are satisfiable for some µ̂∗ ≺ ξ∗.
[Iha93] defines the KL-projection of a probability under some constraints as the measure
that minimises the relative entropy subject to those constraints. In practice, the KL-projection
is defined by giving a Radon-Nikodym derivative that re-scales the original probability to meet
the constraints. This is similar to the rescaling used in the proof of Proposition 57 below.
[Iha93, pp.104-5] proves the following: Define functions θi(λ), i = 1, ..., n, of λ =
(λ1, ..., λn) ∈ Rn by
θi(λ) =
1
Φ(λ)
∫
X
fi(x) exp
{ n∑
j=1
λjfj(x)
}
dξ∗(x), i = 1, ..., n,
where Φ(λ) =
∫
X
exp
{ n∑
j=1
λjfj(x)
}
dξ∗(x).
We denote by Λ the set of all λ for which the integrals above converge, and define a set
A ⊆ (R ∪ {−∞})n by
A = {(θ1(λ), ..., θn(λ));λ ∈ Λ}.
Let M1 be the set of all probabilities on (X,B(X)), ξ∗ ∈M1 be a fixed reference measure,
and fi(x), i = 1, ..., n be real functions defined on X. Assume that F ⊂M1 is a set of the form
F = {µ∗ ∈M1 :
∫
X
fi(x) dµ
∗(x) = ai, i = 1, ..., n},
where ai, i = 1, ..., n are given constants such that (a1, ..., an) ∈ A. Then the KL-projection µ̂∗
on F is given by
dµ̂∗
dξ∗
(x) =
1
Φ(λ)
exp
{ n∑
i=1
λifi(x)
}
, (3)
where λ = (λ1, ..., λn) ∈ Λ is a vector uniquely determined by solving
1
Φ(λ)
∫
X
fi(x) exp
{ n∑
j=1
λjfj(x)
}
dξ∗(x) = ai, i = 1, ..., n.
The corresponding minimum relative entropy is given by
KL(µ̂∗||ξ∗) =
n∑
i=1
λiai − log Φ(λ).
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We will construct, where possible, a function µ that has minimum relative entropy with
respect to ξ while still satisfying our constraints as represented by µ0 and the ϕi, i = 1, ..., n.
First, we construct a function µ∗ on interpretations that will end up meeting our constraints
while minimising the relative entropy to ξ∗.
Choose the fi = [[mod(ϕi)]] as indicator function on X = I, which is 1 on models of ϕi and
zero elsewhere. Set ai = µ0(ϕi), i = 1, ..., n. The constraints (2) then reduce to
µ(ϕi) = µ
∗(mod(ϕi)) =
∫
I
[[mod(ϕi)]]dµ
∗ = ai = µ0(ϕi)
as intended.
Equation (3) then tells us that the scaling function, dµ
∗
dξ∗ , between ξ
∗ and µ∗ is piecewise
constant. In particular, dµ
∗
dξ∗ is constant across each of the sets mod(ψS) related to the sentences,
ψS, constructed in Proposition 51.
µ∗(mod(ϕ)) =
∫
mod(ϕ)
dµ∗
dξ∗
dξ∗ =
∑
S⊆{1:n}
∫
mod(ϕ∧ψS)
dµ∗
dξ∗
dξ∗
=
∑
S⊆{1:n}
∫
mod(ϕ∧ψS)
1
Φ(λ)
exp
{ n∑
i=1
λifi(x)
}
dξ∗(x) [Equation (3)]
=
∑
S⊆{1:n}
1
Φ(λ)
exp
{ n∑
i=1
λifi(mod(ψS))
}
ξ∗(mod(ϕ ∧ ψS)) [fi constant on mod(ψS)]
=
1
Φ(λ)
∑
S⊆{1:n}
exp
{∑
i∈S
λi
}
ξ(ϕ ∧ ψS) [fi = 1 iff i ∈ S]
This leads to the following definition for µˆ:
Definition 55 (minimally more informative probability) Let ξ be an arbitrary probabil-
ity on sentences, and µ0 : {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} → [0, 1] constrain the probability µˆ of the sentences
ϕ1, ..., ϕn. Let
µˆ(ϕ) :=
∑
S⊆{1:n}
wS ξ(ϕ ∧ ψS) [Defining equation]
wS :=
1
Φ(λ)
exp
{∑
j∈S
λj
}
[Weights]
Φ(λ) :=
∑
S⊆{1:n}
exp
{∑
j∈S
λj
}
ξ(ψS) [Normalizing constant]
µ0(ϕi) =
∑
S⊆{1:n}
wS ξ(ϕi ∧ ψS) ≡
∑
S3i
wSξ(ψS)
[
Consistency equations
for λi ∈ R ∪ {−∞}
]
if the expressions are well-defined and a solution exists. Otherwise µˆ is undefined. We call µˆ
minimally more informative than ξ given µ0 (if it exists).
For ϕ = ψS′ , only the term S = S
′ contributes to the defining equations, which gives the
useful relation µˆ(ψS′) = wS′ ξ(ψS′). So indeed, wS = µˆ(ψS)/ξ(ψS) is the local scaling factor.
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Inserting this back into the defining equation, gives
µˆ(ϕ) =
∑
S:ξ(ψS)>0
µˆ(ψS)ξ(ϕ|ψS). (4)
This also implies that if ξ is Gaifman, then µˆ(ϕ) is Gaifman. Furthermore, µˆ(ϕ) > 0 whenever
consistently with µ0 possible and ξ(ϕ) > 0, i.e. for (strongly) Cournot ξ, µˆ is as “Cournot” as
possible.
Proposition 56 (minimally more informative probability) If µ0 can be extended to a
probability on S, and prior ξ(ψn,S) > 0 for all satisfiable ψn,S, then µˆ in Definition 55 is
the unique minimum of the relative entropy w.r.t. ξ under the constraints µˆ(ϕi) = µ0(ϕi),
i = 1, ..., n:
min
µ:µ(ϕi)=µ0(ϕi),i=1..n
{KL(µ||ξ)} = KL(µˆ||ξ)
=
∑
S⊆{1:n}
µˆ(ψS) log
µˆ(ψS)
ξ(ψS)
=
n∑
i=1
λiµ0(ϕi)− log Φ(λ)
Proof. A measure-theoretic proof can be based on the second definition in Definition 54 and
Equation (3). Here we give an elementary proof based on the first definition: First note that the
sum over S is well defined and finite, since ξ(ψS) = 0 implies ψS unsatisfiable implies µˆ(ψS) = 0
by Proposition 19.3. Therefore, wherever necessary or convenient, we interpret sums as being
restricted to those S for which ψS is satisfiable. We have
KL(µ||ξ) =
∑
S⊆{1:n}
µ(ψn,S) log
µ(ψn,S)
ξ(ψn,S)
+ lim
m→∞
∑
S⊆{1:n}
µ(ψn,S)
∑
T⊆{n+1:m}
µ(ψm,S∪T |ψn,S) log µ(ψm,S∪T |ψn,S)
ξ(ψm,S∪T |ψn,S)
By multiplying the first term with 1 =
∑
T⊆{n+1:m} µ(ψm,S∪T |ψn,S) and elementary algebra
one can easily verify that this expression indeed reduces to the first one in Definition 54. Now
we need to minimize this w.r.t. to µ. The first term involves a constrained minimization over
the 2n − 1 “parameters” µ(ψS) : S ⊆ {1 : n}. The second term (for fixed m) involves a free
minimization over the 2n(2m−n − 1) parameters µ(ψm,S∪T |ψn,S) : T ⊆ {n+1 :m}, S ⊆ {1 :n}.
Since the two parameter sets are independent, we can minimize both terms separately. Since
there are no constraints for the second minimization, and the second term is monotone
increasing in m, the unique solution is obviously µ(ψm,S∪T |ψn,S) = ξ(ψm,S∪T |ψn,S). The first
term, since ξ(ψn,S) > 0 and the relative entropy is non-negative and continuous and strictly
convex and the domain is finite-dimensional convex and compact (a 2n − 1 dimensional
probability simplex), it has a unique minimum on the convex subspace generated by the linear
constraints. With Lagrange multipliers and differentiation one can derive the consistency
equations in Definition 55, which uniquely determine the solution (this follows the same line
of reasoning as after Definition 54, but now in finite sample spaces this is elementary).
The next section will develop necessary and sufficient conditions under which µ0 can be
extended to some µ and hence a minimally more informative µ.
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7 Extension of Probabilities
Maintaining consistency in large knowledge bases is a non-trivial problem. Its probabilistic
cousin studied in this section is no easier: Given some probabilistic knowledge, does this cor-
respond to a coherent set of probabilistic beliefs?
More formally, suppose a finite set of sentences are given pre-determined probabilities. An
interesting, and practically important, question is: what are necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of a probability on sentences that gives precisely these probabilities on the
finite set of sentences? The next result answers this question.
Proposition 57 (extension of probabilities) Let the alphabet be countable alphabet,
{ϕ1, ..., ϕn} be a finite set of sentences, and µ0 : {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} → [0, 1] a function. For each
S ⊆ {1:n}, let
ψS := (
∧
i∈S
ϕi) ∧ (
∧
j∈{1:n}\S
¬ϕj).
Then µ0 can be extended to a (Gaifman) probability µ : S → R iff the following set of equations
for the 2n variables αS, for S ⊆ {1:n}, has a solution:∑
S⊆{1:n}
αS = 1∑
S⊆{1:n}:i∈S
αS = µ0(ϕi), for i = 1, ..., n
αS ≥ 0, for S ⊆ {1:n}
αS = 0 if ψS has no (separating) model, for S ⊆ {1:n}.
If the above conditions on αS are met, then Proposition 56 and the remark before it imply
that µ0 can in particular be extended to a probability µˆ that is minimally more informative
than some prior ξ, and µ is Gaifman if ξ is.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose first that µ0 can be extended to a probability µ : S → R. We show that
the set of equations has a solution.
Define αS = µ(ψS), for each S ⊆ {1 : n}. Since the ψS’s are pairwise disjoint, by the
definition of a probability, Proposition 19.6, and Proposition 51.2,
∑
S⊆{1:n} αS = 1. Also∑
S⊆{1:n}:i∈S αS = µ(ϕi) = µ0(ϕi), by Propositions 51.3 and 19.6. Since µ is a probability,
αS ≥ 0 for S ⊆ {1:n}. Finally, αS = 0 if ψS is unsatisfiable for S ⊆ {1:n}, by Proposition 19.3.
(In case µ is Gaifman, we use µ̂∗ of Proposition 31 to show that αS = µ(ψS) = µ̂∗(m̂od(ψS)) =
µ̂∗(∅) = 0 if ψS has no separating model.)
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that the equations have a solution. Let ξ be a strongly Cournot
probability on S (whose existence is given by Proposition 41). Put
Sat = {S ⊆ {1:n} | ψS is satisfiable}.
Define µ : S → R by
µ(ϕ) :=
∑
S∈Sat
αS ξ(ϕ|ψS) =
∑
S∈Sat
wS ξ(ϕ ∧ ψS) (5)
for ϕ ∈ S, where wS := αS/ξ(ψS) for S ∈ Sat. The function µ is well-defined, since ξ(ψS) > 0,
if ψS is satisfiable. We claim that µ is a probability on sentences. Clearly, µ is non-negative.
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Suppose that ϕ is valid. Then
µ(ϕ)
=
∑
S∈Sat αS ξ(ϕ|ψS)
=
∑
S∈Sat αS [ϕ is valid and ξ(·|ψS) is a probability]
= 1. [αS = 0 for S 6∈ Sat]
Suppose that ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) is valid. Then
µ(ϕ ∨ ψ)
=
∑
S∈SatwS ξ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ψS) [Equation (5)]
=
∑
S∈SatwS ξ((ϕ ∧ ψS) ∨ (ψ ∧ ψS))
=
∑
S∈SatwS [ξ(ϕ ∧ ψS) + ξ(ψ ∧ ψS)] [¬((ϕ ∧ ψS) ∧ (ψ ∧ ψS)) valid]
= µ(ϕ) + µ(ψ).
Thus µ is a probability on sentences.
Finally, µ extends µ0:
µ(ϕi) =
∑
S∈Sat
αS ξ(ϕi|ψS) =
∑
S∈Sat:i∈S
αS =
∑
S⊆{1:n}:i∈S
αS = µ0(ϕi)
for i = 1, ..., n, which completes the proof. (To proof that µ is Gaifman, simply replace ‘is
satisfiable’ by ‘has a separating model’ in particular in Sat, and ‘ξ strongly Cournot’ by ‘ξ
Cournot and Gaifman’ in the above proof.)
Next we study conditions on the set of sentences which guarantee that the equations of
Proposition 57 have a solution. First, a necessary condition is introduced.
Definition 58 (subadditive µ0) Let {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} be a finite set of sentences and µ0 :
{ϕ1, ..., ϕn} → [0, 1] a function. Then µ0 is subadditive if, for each i, i1, ..., ik ∈ {1, ..., n}
such that the sentences ϕi1 , ..., ϕik are pairwise disjoint and
∨k
j=1 ϕij → ϕi is valid,
k∑
j=1
µ0(ϕij) ≤ µ0(ϕi) and
k∑
j=1
µ0(ϕij) = µ0(ϕi) if additionally ϕi →
k∨
j=1
ϕij is valid.
Here is another necessary condition that will be needed.
Definition 59 (eligible µ0) Let {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} be a finite set of sentences and µ0 :
{ϕ1, ..., ϕn} → [0, 1] a function. Then µ0 is eligible if, for each i = 1, ..., n, µ0(ϕi) = 0 if
ϕi is unsatisfiable.
Now the conditions of subadditivity and eligibility are shown to be necessary.
Proposition 60 (subadditive and eligible µ0) Let {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} be a finite set of sentences
and µ0 : {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} → [0, 1] a function. Suppose that µ0 can be extended to a probability on S.
Then µ0 is subadditive and eligible.
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Proof. Let µ : S → R be a probability that extends µ0.
Suppose that, for some i, i1, ..., ik ∈ {1, ..., n}, the sentences ϕi1 , ..., ϕik are pairwise disjoint
and
∨k
j=1 ϕij → ϕi is valid. Then∑k
j=1 µ0(ϕij)
=
∑k
j=1 µ(ϕij) [µ extends µ0]
= µ(
∨k
j=1 ϕij) [Proposition 19.6]
≤ µ(ϕi) [Proposition 19.4]
= µ0(ϕi).
Also
ϕi →
∨k
j=1 ϕij is valid
implies µ(
∨k
j=1 ϕij) = µ(ϕi) [
∨k
j=1 ϕij → ϕi is valid]
implies
∑k
j=1 µ(ϕij) = µ(ϕi)
implies
∑k
j=1 µ0(ϕij) = µ0(ϕi).
Thus µ0 is subadditive.
For i ∈ {1, ..., n}, µ(ϕi) = 0 if ϕi is unsatisfiable, since µ is a probability; and µ0(ϕi) = µ(ϕi).
Hence µ0 is eligible.
Now a further structural condition on the set of sentences is introduced that, together
with subaddivity and eligibility, will be sufficient to guarantee that there is a solution of the
equations.
Definition 61 (hierarchical sentences) A finite set of sentences {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} is hierarchical
if, for each i 6= j, exactly one of the following holds: ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj) is valid or ϕi → ϕj is valid or
ϕj → ϕi is valid.
Intuitively, Definition 61 states that, if ϕi and ϕj (i 6= j) are sentences, then either they are
disjoint or one of them is stronger than the other. An hierarchical set of sentences is illustrated
in Figure 1. Each circle or oval indicates the set of models of a particular sentence.
For the next result, the proof is by induction on the depth of an hierarchical set of sentences;
we now define the concept of depth.
Definition 62 (depth of a sentence) Let H be an hierarchical set of sentences. The depth
of ϕ ∈ H is defined to be the length p of the unique sequence ϕ1, ..., ϕp ≡ ϕ of sentences in H
such that (a) ϕi+1 → ϕi is valid, for i = 1, . . . , p−1; (b) for each ψ ∈ H, ϕi+1 → ψ and ψ → ϕi
are valid, for some some i, implies ψ = ϕi+1 or ψ = ϕi; and (c) for each ψ ∈ H, ϕ1 → ψ is
valid implies ψ = ϕ1.
The depth of H is the maximum depth of its sentences.
An empty set of sentences has depth 0. The depth of the set of sentences in Figure 1 is 3.
Proposition 63 (extending hierarchical constraints) Let the alphabet be countable,
{ϕ1, ..., ϕn} a set of sentences, and µ0 : {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} → [0, 1] a subadditive eligible function.
Suppose that {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} is hierarchical. Then µ0 can be extended to a minimally more infor-
mative probability µ : S → R than some prior ξ (see Definition 55), which is Gaifman if ξ
is.
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Figure 1: An hierarchical set of sentences
Proof. The proof is by induction on the depth d of the hierarchical set of sentences.
Suppose first that d = 0, that is, the set of sentences is empty. To show that µ0 can be
extended to a probability µ : S → R, it suffices by Proposition 57 to show that the equations
of that proposition for this case have a solution. Since the index set of the set of sentences is
empty, its only subset is S = ∅. Furthermore, ψS is >. Put αS = 1. Then the first equation
from Proposition 57 is trivially satisfied. The second set of equations does not appear in this
case. Finally, the third and fourth equations are trivially satisfied. This completes the base
case of the induction argument.
Now suppose the result holds for hierarchical sets of sentences having depth d. Let
{ϕ1, ..., ϕn} be an hierarchical set of sentences with depth d + 1. Without loss of general-
ity, we can assume that {ϕ1, ..., ϕp}, for p < n, is an hierarchical set of sentences of depth d and
the sentences ϕp+1, ..., ϕn all have depth d + 1. By the induction hypothesis, µ0 restricted to
{ϕ1, ..., ϕp} can be extended to a probability µ : S → R. Thus, by Proposition 57, the following
set of equations has a solution:∑
S⊆{1:p} αS = 1∑
S⊆{1:p}:i∈S αS = µ0(ϕi), for i = 1, ..., p
αS ≥ 0, for S ⊆ {1:p}
αS = 0 if ψS is unsatisfiable, for S ⊆ {1:p}.
Consider a typical sentence ϕi of depth d that ‘contains’ sentences ϕi1 , ..., ϕik of depth d+1.
Thus ϕi1 , ..., ϕik are pairwise disjoint and
∨k
j=1 ϕij → ϕi is valid. (See Figure 2.) Since µ0 is
subadditive,∑k
j=1 µ0(ϕij) ≤ µ0(ϕi) and∑k
j=1 µ0(ϕij) = µ0(ϕi) if also ϕi →
∨k
j=1 ϕij is valid.
Since µ0 is eligible, µ0(ϕij) = 0 if ϕij is unsatisfiable, for j = 1, ..., k. It has to be shown that
when the depth d+ 1 sentences are added to ϕ1, ..., ϕp, the corresponding set of equations has
a solution.
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To simplify the notation, assume for the moment that ϕi1 , ..., ϕik are all the sentences of
depth d+ 1, so that the index set {1, ..., p} for the set of at-most-depth d sentences is expanded
to {1, ..., n} for the whole set of sentences.
Let Si ⊆ {1, ..., p} be the set of indices of sentences in the ‘path’ down to ϕi in the set of
at-most-depth d sentences, so that ψSi = ϕi is valid. Now consider the full set of sentences.
Then the following are valid:
ψSi∪{i1} = ϕi1
...
ψSi∪{ik} = ϕik
ψSi = ϕi ∧
k∧
i=1
¬ϕij .
Included in the equations for the full set of sentences are the following:
αSi∪{i1} = µ0(ϕi1)
...
αSi∪{ik} = µ0(ϕik)
αSi + αSi∪{i1} + · · ·+ αSi∪{ik} = µ0(ϕi).
(The first k equations are new ones; the last equation replaces αSi = µ0(ϕi) in the set of
equations for the at-most-depth d sentences.)
Furthermore, the term αSi in the first equation of the set of equations for the at-most-depth
d sentences is replaced by αSi + αSi∪{i1} + · · · + αSi∪{ik} in the equations for the full set of
sentences. (This is the only change to the first equation because all the other extra subsets R
of {1, ..., n} that have to be considered lead to ψR that are logically equivalent to ⊥ and hence
have αR = 0.)
Because µ0 is subadditive and eligible, it is clear that
αS ≥ 0, for S ⊆ {1:n}
αS = 0 if ψS is unsatisfiable, for S ⊆ {1:n}
are satisfied.
Thus the set of equations for the full set of sentences has a solution. The case when there
are extra sentences of depth d+ 1 ‘inside’ other ϕj is handled in a similar way.
Now use Propositions 56 and 57 to conclude that µ0 can be extended to a minimally more
informative probability µ : S → R than some prior ξ. This completes the induction argument.
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8 User Manual
This section is a brief outlook on how (approximations of) the theory developed in this paper
might be used in autonomous reasoning agents. We discuss the special case of certain knowledge
and how it can be used to make inferences about statements that are not logical implications of
the knowledge base. For instance, if our agent has observed a large number of ravens which are
all black without exception, how strongly should it belief in the hypothesis that “all ravens are
black”? We construct an agent that can learn in the limit in the usual time-series forecasting
setting with an observation sequence indexed by natural numbers.
Certain knowledge. A common case of knowledge is a set of sentences ϕi, each having
degree of belief 1 (that is, µ0(ϕi) = 1, for i = 1, . . . , n). In other words, there is certainty that
each ϕi is valid in the intended interpretation. This corresponds to non-logical axioms in a
theory. Let ξ be a Cournot probability and suppose that µ is minimally more informative than
ξ given µ0. In this case, each µ(ψS), for S ⊆ {1:n}, is uniquely determined.
To see this, suppose that S 6= {1 : n}, say, i /∈ S, Then µ(ψS) ≤ µ(¬ϕi) = 1 − µ(ϕi) =
1 − µ0(ϕi) = 0, so that µ(ψS) = 0. Hence µ(ψ{1:n}) = 1. Thus, in this situation, by (4) µ
satisfies
µ(ϕ) = ξ(ϕ |ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn), (6)
for ϕ ∈ S. Consequently, there is no optimisation to be done: either ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn is satisfiable
(leading directly to the above definition for µ) or else it is not, in which case there are no
solutions and µ cannot be defined at all.
A further special case beyond the one just considered is when ϕ is a logical consequence of
ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn. In this case,
µ(ϕ) = ξ(ϕ |ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) = ξ(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn)
ξ(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) = 1,
as one would expect. Similarly when ¬ϕ is logical consequence, then µ(ϕ) = 0.
Note that, while it is important that the prior ξ be Cournot, it is just as important that
the posterior µ be allowed not to be Cournot. The prior should be Cournot so that the KL
divergence is as widely defined as possible or, more intuitively, to make sure sentences having
a separating model are not forced to have µ-probability 0. On the other hand, the probability
µ should be allowed to be 0 on sentences having a separating model since the evidence in the
form of the probabilities on ϕ1, . . . , ϕn may imply this. This is apparent, for example, for the
case where each ϕi has probability 1: according to this evidence, any sentence (even one having
a separating model) that is disjoint from ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn must have µ-probability 0.
Black ravens. Consider the infamous problem of the black ravens which is one of the most
notorious problems in confirmation theory [Ear93, RH11]. Let the ravens be identified by
positive integers and B(i) denote the fact that raven i is black. The evidence consists of the
sentences B(1), . . . , B(n). (Thus ϕi ≡ B(i), for i = 1, . . . , n.) Let µ0 : {B(1), . . . , B(n)} →
[0, 1] be defined by µ0(B(i)) = 1, for i = 1, . . . , n. Thus the degree of belief that the ith raven
is black is 1, for i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose that ξ is an uninformative prior that is Cournot and
Gaifman. Since a-priori there are no constraints (on B), this implies that ξ(∀i.B(i)) > 0. Let
µ be a probability that is minimally more informative than ξ given µ0. Thus µ is given by (6).
41
Now consider the sentence ∀i.B(i). This is clearly not a logical consequence of the evidence,
but one can use µ to ascribe a degree of belief that it is true and, furthermore, investigate
what happens to this probability as the number of black ravens increases. Equation (6) and
µ0(B(i)) = 1, for i = 1, . . . , n, and then Theorem 27 applied to Gaifman and Cournot ξ show
that
µ(∀i.B(i)) = ξ(∀i.B(i) |B(1) ∧ · · · ∧B(n)) n→∞−→ 1
Thus, as the number of observed black ravens increases, the degree of belief that all ravens are
black approaches 1. Of course this also implies the weaker statement that our belief in the next
raven being black tends to one:
ξ(B(n+ 1) |B(1) ∧ · · · ∧B(n)) n→∞−→ 1
Naive black ravens. Continuing the preceding example, suppose given the evidence
B(1), . . . , B(n), each having probability 1, one wants to know the degree of belief for B(n+ 1).
Consider the tree construction in Theorem 52 for ξ but with sentences ϕ1, ϕ2, ... only ranging
over ϕi = B(i) and uniform αn,S = 2
−n. Then
ξ(B(n+ 1) |B(1) ∧ · · · ∧B(n))
=
ξ(B(1) ∧ · · · ∧B(n) ∧B(n+ 1))
ξ(B(1) ∧ · · · ∧B(n))
=
αn+1,{1:n+1}
αn,{1:n}
= 1/2.
Thus, for this prior, knowing the evidence so far, even for large n, does not give any information
about B(n + 1). But it gets worse: Assume ξ is somehow extended to a probability on all S.
Then for any m ≥ n,
ξ(∀i.B(i) |B(1) ∧ · · · ∧B(n)) ≤ ξ(B(1) ∧ · · · ∧B(m) |B(1) ∧ · · · ∧B(n)) = (1
2
)m−n
hence ξ(∀i.B(i) |B(1)∧· · ·∧B(n)) ≡ 0 for all n, i.e. universal hypotheses can not be confirmed.
Even more seriously, we would be absolutely sure that non-black ravens exist
ξ(∃i.¬B(i) |B(1) ∧ · · · ∧B(n)) ≡ 1
and no number of observed black ravens n without any counter examples will ever convince
us otherwise. These conclusions qualitatively hold even when ϕ1, ϕ2, ... ranges over all or any
subset of quantifier-free/lambda-free sentences. There seem to be no simple local rules for
choosing αn,S that allow confirmation of all universal hypotheses. This shows that it is crucial
to include quantified sentences when constructing a prior and ensure it is Cournot (even when
only making inferences about unquantified sentences like B(n+ 1)).
Corollary 64 (learning in the limit) Let ı ≡ Nat, ϕ be a closed term of type Nat → o, µ
be a Gaifman probability on sentences, and µ(∀x.(ϕ x)) > 0. Then
lim
n→∞
µ(∀x.(ϕ x) | (ϕ 0) ∧ · · · ∧ (ϕ n)) = 1
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This generalizes the black raven example and follows from Theorem 27. In particular,
learning in the limit is possible for the Gaifman and Cournot probability constructed in the
proof of Theorem 40, provided ∀x.(ϕ x) has a separating model.
The proof crucially exploits that 0, 1, 2, ... are representatives of all terms of type Nat.
As discussed in Example 48, this would no longer be true had we introduced a description
operator into our logic. Corollary 64 would break down and universal hypotheses over the
natural numbers could not be inductively confirmed, not even asymptotically.
Approximations. The construction of Cournot and Gaifman µ in the proof of Theorem 40
required to determine particular separating models for χi and to determine whether they are
also models of other sentences ϕ. This has been eased by Corollary 53, which only requires
determining wether sentences ψn,S have (no) separating model. Still this is non-decidable.
Assume we had some calculus to determining whether sentences have (no) separating model.
Even an asymptotic or approximate or incomplete calculus may be of use. Fix a sequence on-
the-fly of all sentences ϕ2, ϕ3, ... satisfying Theorem 52.4 (once and for all). Determine the
subsequence of all sentences χ1 = ϕj1 , χ2 = ϕj2 , ... with separating models (on the fly).
In order to determine µ to accuracy ε > 0 for some finite number of sentences {ϕi1 , ..., ϕin}
of interest, we have to perform the tree construction “only” for ϕ1 ∈ {χ1, ..., χm}, where∑∞
i=m+1 < ε and up to depth d = max{i1, ..., in}, i.e. determine finitely many cases. If a
new sentence ϕin+1 of interest “arrives” or higher precision is needed, d respectively m can be
increased appropriately (that’s what was meant with on-the-fly). It is important to expand the
already existing trees with assigned probabilities, rather than restarting the procedure with a
larger d, since this can lead to wrong inductive limits if different choices are made every time.
Work flow example for a simple inductive reasoning agent. Below we present an
example of a fictitious inductive reasoning agent. It is fictitious, since many operations are
incomputable. In practice one needs to employ approximations at various steps. How to do
this is an open problem.
1. Assume the agent has been endowed with some background knowledge e.g. about ki-
netics, colors, biology, birds, etc. Its knowledge is represented in the form of a hierarchical
(Definition 61) set of sentences {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} that hold for sure (µ0(ϕi) = 1 for some i) or with
some probability 0 < µ0(ϕi) < 1 for the other i. Our expressive higher-order logic provides a
convenient way of doing so [LN11].
2. Assume µ0 is subadditive and eligible (Definitions 58 and 59). This may not be so easy
to achieve, and is akin to the general problem of maintaining consistent knowledge bases.
3. Next, use an approximation of a Gaifman and Cournot ξ prior, e.g. as defined in the
proof of Theorems 40 or Theorem 50 or Corollary 53 or and approximation thereof as outlined
above. The agent now constructs via Definition 55 the minimally more informative probability
µ, which exists by Proposition 63 and is Gaifman by Proposition 57 and the remark after
Equation (4).
4. Let o0, o1, o2, ... be the agent’s life-time sequence of past and future observations of all
kinds of objects, ravens and otherwise, all it has/will ever observe, e.g. on is what the agent
sees n seconds after it has been switched on.
5. Assume current time is n, and the agent needs to hypothesize about the world to decide
its next action, e.g. whether some observed regularity is “real”. For instance, “if observation at
time k is a raven, is it also black?”. We can formalize this with a predicate ϕ of type Nat→ o
with the intended interpretation of (ϕ k) as “if observation at time k is a raven, it is black”.
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6. Of course the answer to (ϕ 0), ..., (ϕ n) is immediate, since o0, ..., on have already been
observed. If they are all true, the agent may start to wonder whether “all ravens are black”,
or formally, whether ∀x.(ϕ x) is true. Note that non-raven observations in the sequence are
allowed.
7. If the agent is equipped with our inductive reasoning system, its degree of belief in this
hypothesis is µ(∀x.(ϕ x)|(ϕ 0) ∧ · · · ∧ (ϕ n)).
8. This result can be the basis for some decision process maximizing some utilities resulting
in an informed action.
Is the degree of belief derived in Step 7 and used in Step 8 reasonable? At least asymp-
totically Corollary 64 ensures that in the limit the agent’s belief tends to 1, which is very
reasonable. So our system of inductive reasoning at least passes this test. Most other inductive
reasoning systems have difficulties in getting this right [RH11].
The Monty Hall Problem. The Monty Hall problem is based on a US game show. A
contestant is presented with three doors. Behind one of the doors is a prize. The other two
doors have nothing behind them. The contestant is asked to select a door. After the contestant
selects a door, but before that door is opened, the game host selects and opens one of the other
two doors. At this point the contestant is again asked to select their preferred door and will
win whatever is behind this final selection.
It is expected that the host will not reveal the prize. This constraint means that the host
will always open a door to reveal nothing behind it. This limits the contestant’s second choice
to either persisting with the door selected originally, or switching to the remaining door. It is
a known, if counterintuitive, result that the best strategy for the contestant is to switch doors.
Let ı ≡ Door . We introduce the constants D1, D2, D3 : Door and
playerFirstSelection, hostSelection, prizeDoor : Door → o
unique : (Door → o)→ o.
As we shall see, the function unique is used to capture the constraint on the preceding three
predicates that exactly one door makes each of them true. With those, we can now define a set
of sentences:
ϕ1 := (unique = λp.∃d.((p d) ∧ ∀x.((p x) −→ x = d))) ∧
(unique playerFirstSelection) ∧ (unique hostSelection) ∧ (unique prizeDoor)
ϕ2 := (prizeDoor d1)
ϕ3 := (prizeDoor d2)
ϕ4 := (playerFirstSelection d1)
ϕ5 := (playerFirstSelection d2)
ϕ6 := ∀d.((hostSelection d) −→ (¬(playerF irstSelection d) ∧ ¬(prizeDoor d)))
ϕ7 := (hostSelection d1)
ϕ8 := (hostSelection d2)
ϕ9 := ∃d. ((playerFirstSelection d) ∧ (prizeDoor d))
Selection of the correct prior is very important for this problem. We require that the prior
be symmetric in which door makes the prizeDoor predicate true, and which door makes the
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playerFirstSelection predicate true. We also require that there be no correlation between the
doors that make these predicates true in the prior.
We now perform the tree construction from Proposition 51 using the set of sentences above.
We leave out any branches that will have prior probability 0. Because of the requirements that
the prior be symmetric and uncorrelated, each of the leaf nodes of the following tree will have
equal probability. Note that these requirements mean that ξ(ϕ2) = 1/3 rather than 0.5 as
usual.
Predicates unique
Prize location
Player selection
¬ϕ1 ϕ1
ϕ2¬ϕ2
¬ϕ3ϕ3¬ϕ3
ϕ4¬ϕ4ϕ4¬ϕ4ϕ4¬ϕ4
¬ϕ5ϕ5¬ϕ5¬ϕ5ϕ5¬ϕ5¬ϕ5ϕ5¬ϕ5
Assume, without loss of generality, that the prize is located behind door 1. This allows us to
zoom in onto the right-most sub-tree rooted at ¬ϕ3 and add the Host door selection predicates.
These predicates are the host constraints, ϕ6, which we will require to be true with probability
1, and then predicates that elicit the host’s selection. As not all host selections are legal, some
branches here have probability 0 (shown dashed).
Player selection
Host constraints
Host selection
ϕ4¬ϕ4
¬ϕ5ϕ5¬ϕ5
ϕ6ϕ6ϕ6
¬ϕ7¬ϕ7¬ϕ7
ϕ8¬ϕ8¬ϕ8ϕ8
ϕ7ϕ7ϕ7
ϕ8¬ϕ8
Each of the three major branches with non-zero probability has equal prior probability. Of
these the left-hand two (¬ϕ4) each have the host forced to open one particular door, and hence
the remaining door has the prize – the player is better off swapping. Only on the left hand
branch when the player correctly guessed the prize initially is the player better off not swapping,
but this is a less likely outcome than the other. Hence the player is better off swapping.
9 Discussion
A key goal of this research is that of integrating logic and probability, a problem that has a
history going back around 300 years and for which three main threads can be discerned. The
oldest by far is the philosophical/mathematical thread that can be traced via Boole [Boo54,
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Boo52] back to Jacob Bernoulli in 1713. An extensive historical account of this thread can
be found in [Hai96]; the idea of putting probabilities on sentences goes back to before [ Los55]
which contains references to even earlier material; the important Gaifman condition appeared
in [Gai64] and was further developed in [GS82]; in [SK66] the theory is developed for infinitary
logic; overviews of more recent work from a philosophical perspective can be found in [Ha´j01,
Wil02, Wil08b]. The second thread is that of the knowledge representation and reasoning
community in artificial intelligence, of which [Nil86, Hal90, FH94, Hal03, SA07] are typical
works. The third thread is that of the machine learning community in artificial intelligence,
of which [Mug96, DK03, MMR+05, RD06, MR07, dSB07, KD07, Pfe07, GMR+08] are typical
works.
An important and useful technical distinction that can be made between these various
approaches is that the combination of logic and probability can be done externally or internally
[Wil08b]: in the external view, probabilities are attached to sentences in some logic; in the
internal view, sentences incorporate statements about probability. One can even mix the two
cases so that probabilities appear both internally and externally. We now examine each of these
in turn.
Probabilities inside sentences. In the internal view, the uncertainty is modeled inside
the sentences of a theory. For this to be possible, we must make a careful choice of logic; in
particular, first-order logic (alone) is not expressive enough for this purpose. There has been a
tradition of extending first-order logic with probabilistic extensions [Hal03, Ha´j01, Wil02]. A
good alternative approach, studied in [NL09, NLU08], is to simply adopt higher-order logic.
The most crucial property of higher-order logic that we exploit is that it admits so-called higher-
order functions which take functions as arguments and/or return functions as results. It is this
property that allows the modelling of, and reasoning about, probabilistic concepts directly in
higher-order theories.
Probabilities outside sentences. In contrast to the internal view, almost all other ap-
proaches to integrating logic and probability model uncertainty by putting probabilities outside
sentences. This natural idea has been taken up by many researchers and has a large body of
theoretical support. Here we follow the lead of Gaifman and Snir for first-order logic in [GS82]
(that builds on earlier work in [Gai64]). They showed that, under certain conditions, there is
a probability on sentences that is strictly positive on consistent sentences (that is, those that
have a model). This is an important property of any probability that is intended to be used as
a prior in Bayesian inference. An accessible account of this material can be found in [Par94].
Other such systems, and there are now many of these, include Bayesian logic programs
[KD07], Markov logic networks [RD06], and stochastic logic programs [Mug96]. While the
intention is usually that the probabilities define (or at least constrain) a distribution on the set
of interpretations, some systems take other approaches. For example, the probabilities can be
used to define a distribution on proofs or a distribution on programs. For a taxonomy of such
systems, see [MR07].
Conclusion. This paper provides much of the foundation for the design of an integrated
probabilistic reasoning system that can handle probabilities both inside and outside sentences.
The main challenge for the future lies in the discovery of reasonable approximation schemes for
the different currently incomputable aspects of the general theory.
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